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THEORIZING FORMS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Dana Brakman Reiser∗
Jurisdictions across the country and around the globe are enacting
legislation enabling founders of social enterprises to adopt specialized forms
to house their entities. These forms blend elements traditionally found in
nonprofit organizational forms, such as commitment to a social mission, with
elements from for-profit business structures, such as the ability to attract
investors. These legal forms appear to offer founders and investors the ability
to “do well by doing good” and give consumers and employees access to
“companies with a soul.” These aspirations, however, have not yet been fully
realized by any of the specialized forms currently available. In other work, I
have described and critiqued the specifics of the various new forms, both here
and abroad. This Article takes a step back, and examines the broader
theoretical question of what specialized forms would have to provide in order
for them to help social enterprise to realize its claimed potential.
INTRODUCTION
Social enterprise is a hotly contested term. For present purposes, though, a
general idea will suffice. By social enterprise, I mean an organization formed
to achieve social goals using business methods. Think companies that use onefor-one models1 like TOMS shoes2 and Warby Parker,3 or employ “hard-to-

∗ Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I greatly appreciate the support of Brooklyn Law School’s
summer research stipend program, the research assistance of Joseph Binder, and the comments and
suggestions of Fred Bloom, Steven Dean, Lyman Johnson, Rob Katz, Claire Kelly, Melanie Leslie, Jeff Reiser,
Adam Zimmerman, and the panelists and participants at the Emory Law Journal Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium on “Innovation for the Modern Era: Law, Policy, and Practice in a Changing World.” Versions of
this project were also presented at a Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop and at the 2012 Annual Meeting
program of the AALS Section on Agency, Partnership, LLC’s and Unincorporated Associations, and I thank
those who participated for their insights. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1 Companies with a one-for-one model typically produce consumer goods and “for every unit of a
product sold, the company donates one similar or related item to people in need.” Alisen Downey, A One-forOne Revolution, E MAG., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 40, 40 (describing various companies using the model).
2 TOMS, http://www.toms.com/ (last visited May 10, 2013) (“With every pair you purchase, TOMS will
give a pair of new shoes to a child in need.”).
3 Do Good, WARBY PARKER, http://www.warbyparker.com/do-good/#home (last visited May 10, 2013)
(“For every pair of glasses we sell, we provide a pair to someone in need.”).
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employ,” low-income, or foreign-born individuals like Greyston Bakery4 and
Hot Bread Kitchen.5 Think of your favorite green or locally sourced business
or of one serving customers at the bottom of the pyramid.6 Founders,
proponents, and evangelists of social enterprise, sometimes called social
entrepreneurs, have big aspirations for it.
Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.7
They claim social enterprises can do more good for more people than
traditional nonprofits because their financing and business methods make them
more efficient, effective, and scalable.8 These advocates see social enterprises

4 The Greyston Bakery’s Guiding Principles, GREYSTON BAKERY, http://www.greystonbakery.com/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/greyston-bakery-guiding-principles.pdf (last visited May 10, 2013) (stating its dual
commitments to “consistently achieve an operating profit” and to “continue its open-hiring policy, and the
associated apprenticeship program, in order to provide opportunity to [inner-city] Yonkers’[s] hard-to-employ
population”).
5 Our Mission, HOT BREAD KITCHEN, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-us/our-mission (last visited May
10, 2013) (describing its mission to “increase[] economic security for foreign-born and low-income women
and men by opening access to the billion dollar specialty food industry . . . [through its] culinary workforce
and business incubation programs” and its sale of “delicious multi-ethnic breads”).
6 See C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY
THROUGH PROFITS 4 (2005) (describing the “bottom of the pyramid” as the more than four billion individuals
with the lowest purchasing power parity worldwide); see also, e.g., Nicole Wallace, Opportunity International
Spins Off Insurance Company, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 17, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://philanthropy.com/
blogs/innovation/opportunity-international-spins-off-insurance-company/1653 (featuring MicroEnsure, a
nonprofit transitioning to for-profit status in order to scale its venture in selling low-cost insurance to “people
in the developing world [who] are one failed crop, one illness, or one emergency away from financial ruin”).
7 J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
1, 5–6 (Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Walstad eds., 2003).
8 See, e.g., Charles R. Bronfman & Jeffrey R. Solomon, Should Philanthropies Operate like Businesses?
Yes: Good Intentions Aren’t Enough, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at R1 (“[T]o have a sustained and strategic
impact, philanthropy must be conducted like business—with discipline, strategy and a strong focus on
outcomes.”); Dan Pallotta, Why Can’t We Sell Charity like We Sell Perfume?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2012, at
C1 (“If we free the nonprofit sector to hire the best talent in the world, take fundraising risks, use marketing to
build demand and invest capital for new revenue-generating efforts, we could bring private ingenuity to bear
on [the world’s] problems and would not need to look to government to fill the gaps.” (emphasis added)).
Of course, there are also critics of the social enterprise trend. See, e.g., Phil Buchanan, Charities Should
Resist Drinking the “Kool-Aid” of Business Superiority, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 20, 2012, at 56 (“[T]he
rush to embrace the idea that for-profits can more easily combat our toughest social problems denies the reality
that many crucial objectives simply cannot be accomplished while generating a financial return.”); Michael
Edwards, Should Philanthropies Operate like Businesses? No, the Poorest Will Suffer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2011, at R1 (“[T]he colonization of philanthropy by business could turn it into a much more conservative force
and limit its potential to get at the really difficult problems.”).
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as a different and exciting new way forward, but they lambast one very
improbable obstacle: legal form.9
Under this view, traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal forms frustrate
social entrepreneurs’ bold new vision for achieving social change.10 The
backward, old law forces a founder to choose between two equally inadequate
categories. If she forms a for-profit, particularly a for-profit corporation,
shareholder primacy will force her to single-mindedly focus on profit, with no
way to protect the social mission of the entity or its founders. If she forms a
nonprofit, this social vision can be protected, but business strategies, especially
equity capital, are foreclosed. These mutually exclusive legal categories, the
story goes, prevent social enterprises from pursuing mutually reinforcing
commitments to profit and social good—and shortchange us all in the process.
Across the country and around the globe, jurisdictions have begun to
respond to these claims by offering a variety of specialized legal forms
intended to house social enterprises. Thus far, these include the low-profit
limited liability company, the benefit corporation, the benefit LLC, the flexible
purpose corporation, and the social-purpose corporation.11 More will likely
proliferate. Much legal scholarship in this fledgling area, including my own,
has focused on understanding and critiquing the specifics of these enactments
and proposals.12 This Article does something new. It begins to theorize
whether and how any legal form can do the work desired by social enterprise
founders.
This work falls along three principal dimensions: permitting, achieving,
and branding the difference of social enterprises. Social entrepreneurs begin
with their desire to blend their profit-making and social missions in a single
9 See, e.g., Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer
2012, at 51, 52 (describing the “confusing dilemma” facing social entrepreneurs confronted with only pure forprofit and nonprofit organizational forms); William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 851
(2012) (“The sustainable business movement, impact investing, and social enterprise sectors are developing
rapidly, but are constrained by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped to accommodate for-profit
entities whose social benefit purpose is central to their existence.”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity
on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 363–64 (2009); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit
Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 99, 99 (lamenting that “socially minded entrepreneurs end up
shoehorning their vision into one structure or the other and accepting burdensome trade-offs in the process”).
10 Battilana et al., supra note 9, at 52.
11 See Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Charity, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2011, at B1. As this Article goes to press, Delaware is moving toward adoption of its own specialized
form, the “public benefit corporation.”
12 See, e.g., infra notes 35, 39, 43 (L3Cs, benefit corporations, and FPCs, respectively).
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entity. They believe in the unique ability of social enterprise to solve social
problems and return profits to owners. Rather than hiding these dual
aspirations behind a veneer of “business as usual” or under a halo of
selflessness, these founders want to claim their social enterprises’ blended
missions explicitly. For a specialized legal form to succeed, it must permit
social entrepreneurs to embrace this different ideal.
Blended value, however, could easily remain purely aspirational. After all,
pursuing profit and social good will not always lead in the same direction.
Sometimes, perhaps often, they can be mutually reinforcing, especially if one
takes the long view. For example, imagine that a social enterprise furniture
manufacturer locates its factory in an economically depressed area, employing
the formerly jobless and investing in the community. Its dedication draws
skilled craftsmen to the area and their creations become darlings of the design
world. The business endures and the reinvigorated town thrives.
But not every story will have an easy route to such a happy ending. Perhaps
the skilled craftsmen need to be wooed to the town with high salaries, while
frustrated local workers toil for a subsistence wage. Even if the stars align at
the outset, eventually there will have to be decisions where profit and social
good come into conflict and must be traded off. Perhaps this social enterprise
will design the new “it” chair and make millions. Still, its managers will need
to decide what portion of each dollar of earnings to donate to the community,
or to invest in modernizing the plant, or to return to investors, without whom
none of this would have happened. They will need to set prices, choose
suppliers, hire, and fire. Social entrepreneurs say they will make these
decisions in a way different than traditional for-profit or nonprofit entities. But,
for adoption of a specialized legal form to indicate that an entity actually is
different, it must impose a new and unambiguous baseline standard and
provide for its reliable enforcement.
Only by doing so can a specialized legal form reach the ultimate goal of
social entrepreneurs who seek them: to become a brand. Social entrepreneurs
want to convey to investors that their entities will provide a different and better
overall return—doing more for investors’ pocketbooks than a charitable
donation and more for their souls than an ordinary stock or bond. Furthermore,
social entrepreneurs also want to reach consumers, employees, partners, and
the public with positive messages about their different and better companies. A
specialized legal form that serves as an effective brand will help social
entrepreneurs to communicate these points.
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The rest of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I demonstrates that there
are many ways a specialized form can permit social entrepreneurs to pursue
both social good and profit. Part II, however, explains that for a specialized
form to succeed it must challenge the idyllic version of the social enterprise,
demanding realism and specificity about an entity’s goals and the priority
among them. This Part urges lawmakers to adopt a clear standard requiring
entities adopting specialized forms to prioritize social good. It then explores
various legal avenues for doing so. Part III canvasses the mechanisms that
might be used to enforce such a standard. It might be policed from within or
outside the entity, publicly or privately, and each enforcement mechanism
comes with its own unique challenges. Finally, Part IV addresses the capacity
of specialized legal forms to serve as brands. If a specialized form imposes a
clear standard and creates viable enforcement mechanisms, it can communicate
that its adopters are meaningfully different from for-profit or nonprofit
competitors. This achievement would deliver considerable branding value to
social enterprise, but it would still not convey all of the positive messages
social entrepreneurs wish to transmit.
I. PERMITTING DIFFERENCE
One of the most basic things social entrepreneurs seek in a specialized legal
form is safe space to declare that their entities are committed to a new and
different goal—pursuing both profit and social good. The simple expression of
this commitment is transgressive in traditional nonprofit legal entities. It is at
best fraught, and at worst unlawful, in traditional for-profit ones. This Part
explains why. It also introduces three types of specialized forms for social
enterprise now available in the United States and explains how each creates an
entity based on express permission to pursue blended missions.
A. Traditional Forms’ Problems
Nonprofits can be formed as nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts, and
both impose a strong “nondistribution constraint”13 utterly incompatible with a
hybrid mission. With very limited exceptions, a nonprofit corporation simply
“shall not make any distributions.”14 A distribution is defined as a “payment of
13 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (“A
nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to
individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.”).
14 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987). Similar prohibitions on distributions are
likewise imposed by federal tax law upon nonprofits exempt from income taxation and eligible to receive tax-
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a dividend or any part of the income or profit of a corporation to its members,
directors or officers.”15 For charitable trusts, a similarly stark rule obtains: “A
trust is not a charitable trust if the property or the income therefrom is to be
devoted to a private use.”16 A charitable trust does not lose this designation
“merely because its operation results in a profit,” but if its profits are “applied
to private purposes . . . the trust ceases to be charitable.”17 Although nonprofit
organizations can pay their employees reasonable compensation, it is
absolutely off-limits for them to provide a share of net profits to founders as a
return on their investment.18 Nonprofits are similarly barred from soliciting
equity capital from others.19 Thus, a social enterprise taking a nonprofit legal
form cannot expressly commit to pursuing both social good and profits for
owners.
Nor do social entrepreneurs perceive traditional for-profit forms as
particularly hospitable. This perception stems in part from a debate about
corporate law. Many legal scholars argue that owner wealth maximization need
not be the sole or exclusive goal of a for-profit corporation.20 Indeed, the
American Law Institute suggests a dual-mission, for-profit corporation would
deductible contributions. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c) (2006) (stating eligibility criteria for such
organizations, including that “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual”).
15 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40 (1987).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28
cmt. a (2003) (commenting in the reporter’s notes that this language in the prior Restatement “is worth
recalling”).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 cmt. d (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 28 cmt. a(1) (2003) (explaining that a charitable trust may provide services on a fee-paid basis without
risking its charitable status, so long as it “does not seek to make a profit to benefit its shareholders or otherwise
to serve a noncharitable purpose”).
18 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1987).
19 See Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2008, at 41, 42–43
(noting that nonprofits suffer due to an inability to raise equity capital).
20 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 25–31 (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738–47 (2005); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good:
Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 996–1007
(2009); see also Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corporations, 25
REGENT U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 40), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2177049 (critiquing “the unresolved muddle in corporate law doctrine and theory concerning
the inter-relationship among corporate purpose, a corporation’s best interests, and fiduciary duties” and
arguing that benefit corporation statutes partly, but not fully, illuminate it); Mark A. Underberg, Benefit
Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporationsvs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ (advocating a similar view and warning of the dangerous
implications of specialized forms for the ability of traditional for-profits to pursue nonshareholder interests).
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be unproblematic, so long as its owners agreed.21 Others are less sanguine
about the place of goals other than enhancing shareholder value within forprofit corporations, accepting a strong shareholder wealth maximization
norm.22 Even among this norm’s most strident proponents, however, there is
wide recognition that outside of the takeover context, the business judgment
rule will shelter corporate directors from liability for virtually all operational
decisions.23 In states with constituency statutes, such decisions will be
protected even in response to a takeover threat.24 Thus, directors appear to
21 See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01, at 73 n.6 (1994) (“[T]here is little doubt that [restrictions on the general profit-making objective] would
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders. Such an agreement might be embodied in the
certificate of incorporation, or not.”).
22 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply
to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1424–25 (1993) (noting that “[a]t least in Delaware, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm thus remains a more accurate description of the state of the law than
any of its competitors” and embracing that norm) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]; Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (asserting that
“there is today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate
managers should be accountable”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That ForProfit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (opining that “corporate law
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for
the stockholders”); see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41–42 (2006) (describing
shareholder primacy as a “foundational principle” that “informs every aspect of corporate and securities law”
in a work arguing corporate law should embrace a broader sense of proper corporate purposes). Although
Professor Bainbridge remains committed to the shareholder wealth maximization norm, he has recently argued
the debate about corporate purpose is futile. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Vacuity of Corporate Purpose,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 05, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-vacuity-of-corporate-purpose.html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Vacuity].
23 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 22, at 1439 (opining that “the business judgment rule will
insulate directors from liability without regard to the shareholder wealth consequences of the board’s decision
in the vast majority of cases”). Other scholars who challenge a strong shareholder wealth maximization norm
have made similar observations. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1022
(2011) (“[E]ven if one accepts the view that corporate law requires fiduciaries to focus on shareholder wealth,
the business judgment rule affords corporate decision makers so much latitude as to render any such duty
unenforceable and meaningless.”); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 232 (2010) (“Under the business judgment rule,
courts will almost invariably defer to the directors’ judgment. As long as a course of action may lead to some
potential benefit to shareholders, even in the far distant future, the directors’ decisions will survive judicial
review.” (footnote omitted)).
24 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary
Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 132 (2010) (explaining that “constituency statutes formally
allow corporate directors to consider the interests of some combination of non-shareholder[]” constituencies in
the takeover context, and sometimes more broadly); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good:
Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 460–61 (2002) (offering a similar description); Eric W. Orts,
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 27–29 (1992)
(same).
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have little to fear from decisions that will not strictly, and in the short term,
pursue maximum value for shareholders.
One could take this narrow gap between scholars on either side of the
question as close enough to consensus that a for-profit corporation could
effectively house a social enterprise. Yet, various practical impediments
remain. For example, anecdotal reports explain that one reason for initiating
specialized-form legislation has been the unwillingness of a secretary of state’s
office to accept articles of incorporation from for-profit corporations that
evinced a blended mission.25 Corporate directors themselves also may embrace
and comply with a strong shareholder primacy norm regardless of the positions
of corporate law scholars.26 They may do so not entirely out of misplaced fears
of legal repercussions; vulnerability to takeover attempts or fears that investors
will lose confidence can make it risky for for-profit entities to articulate a dual
mission.
Of course, the risk of liability to shareholders all but disappears in small,
closely held corporations. If directors and shareholders are the same
individuals, there is little threat of suit. Shareholders in such corporations can
also contract around many of these issues in a carefully drafted shareholders’
agreement. Moreover, incorporation is hardly the only option for those seeking
a for-profit form. Partnership and LLC forms are known for their flexibility,
and their governance can be largely and idiosyncratically structured by
partnership or operating agreements. These contracts can provide social
entrepreneurs with a venue to express their entities’ commitment to profit and

25 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 591, 592, 608 (2011).
26 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (noting that “[n]orms in American business circles, starting with business school
education, emphasize the value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of maximizing shareholder wealth”);
Stephen Bainbridge, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5,
2012, 12:51 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-shareholderwealth-maximization-norm.html (citing surveys of directors reporting their prioritization of shareholder
interests). But see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 290–91 (1998);
Sneirson, supra note 20, at 1011–12 (arguing businesspersons have more complex views on corporate
objectives). A detailed empirical study of directors’ views on this question can be found in JAY W. LORSCH
WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 37–54
(1989), which found that corporate directors “believe the shareholders are their most important constituents
when reaching decisions,” but they view their role to more appropriately include a broader focus. These
findings are also discussed in Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1263, 1292–94 (1992).
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social good.27 Fiduciaries in partnerships and LLCs that do so should have
little to fear from owners who opt into them despite clear notice of these dual
commitments.
Still, social entrepreneurs might not see closely held corporations, LLCs, or
partnerships as sufficient solutions.28 The most ambitious worry about scale;29
incorporation has long been seen as a stop along the path to largeness, if not to
greatness. For founders with lofty (some might say unrealistic) goals for their
enterprises’ success, these forms will soon become overly constraining. At the
other extreme are concerns about access. For those without counsel, let alone
ambitions of publicly traded shares, highly adjustable forms may be difficult to
manage. Small and legally unsophisticated founders will have neither expertise
nor counsel to engage in complex contract drafting. Instead, they will want an
off-the-rack legal form for dual-mission entities.30
B. Specialized Forms’ Solutions
The low-profit limited liability company (L3C), benefit corporation, and
flexible purpose corporation (FPC) are designed to fill this need. These
specialized forms, now available in one-third of U.S. jurisdictions,31 provide a

27 See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 896–97 (2010) (arguing that ordinary LLCs are quite
capable of housing businesses committed to social good); see also J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The
L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 286–88 (2010) (explaining the
difficulty of drafting an LLC operating agreement to resolve the tensions between profit and social-good goals,
but arguing they would be the same for an LLC or L3C).
28 General partnership, of course, raises the additional concern of personal liability for owners. See, e.g.,
REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997).
29 JOHN ELKINGTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 179–96 (2008)
(discussing the challenges of “scaling” up); Michael Chertok et al., The Funding Gap, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Spring 2008, at 44, 46 (“One of the reasons social enterprises have trouble raising money is
that they do not fit neatly into either the traditional nonprofit or for-profit model.”); J. Gregory Dees et al.,
Scaling Social Impact: Strategies for Spreading Social Innovations, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring
2004, at 24 (advising social entrepreneurs on the ways to overcome their challenges in increasing their scale).
30 See Sabeti, supra note 9, at 99 (arguing more social enterprises would exist if they could adopt “a
legally recognized organizational structure”); Kyle Westaway, New Legal Structures for “Social
Entrepreneurs,” WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203
413304577088604063391944.html (touting the benefits of affordable new specialized legal forms available to
social entrepreneurs).
31 See Laws, AM. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.html (last
visited May 10, 2013) (listing nine states and two Native American tribes with L3C statutes); State by State
Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status
(last visited May 10, 2013) (listing fifteen states with benefit corporation statutes, two of which also have L3C
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forum for social entrepreneurs to safely proclaim their blended missions
proudly. Each does so by starting with an established for-profit legal form and
adding a social mission component to it.
The L3C adds charitable or educational purpose requirements to an
otherwise standard LLC framework. Rather than developing its own definition
of charitable or educational, L3C statutes import definitions developed under
the Internal Revenue Code.32 In addition, “[n]o significant purpose” of an L3C
can be “the production of income or the appreciation of property,”33 although
producing significant income or capital appreciation will not alone render an
entity ineligible for L3C status.34 An entity can retain this status as long as its
purposes remain in line. Importantly, if an L3C ceases to comply, it simply and
immediately transforms into an ordinary LLC.35
Benefit corporations are incorporated entities that, along with profits, must
pursue a “general public benefit.”36 The level of detail benefit corporation
statutes use in defining general public benefit varies across jurisdictions.
Uniformly, though, they describe general public benefit as “a material positive
impact on society and the environment” and “as measured by a third-party
standard.”37 These third-party standards lie at the heart of the benefit

legislation, and three of which also allow L3Cs). As of this writing, California and Washington are the only
states to have passed FPC and social-purpose corporation legislation, respectively.
32 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (West
Supp. 2012).
33 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302(C)(1)(b) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B).
34 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01(d)(2) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29102(a)(ix)(B) (West Supp. 2012). In addition, L3Cs may not be formed to “accomplish one or more political or
legislative purposes,” again as defined by the tax code. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01(d)(2); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(C).
35 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-76(c) (West Supp.
2012). Several detailed analyses of the L3C form are available. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC
(L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); Dana Brakman
Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 620–30 (2010); Kleinberger,
supra note 27, at 896–97; J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance,
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2011).
36 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(a) (West 2013); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 56C-01(c) (West Supp. 2012). An intriguing model for benefit corporation legislation, drafted by proponents, is
available online. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://benefitcorp.org/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf. This Article, however, will instead cite legislation as
actually adopted by various jurisdictions as examples.
37 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West Supp. 2012).

REISER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

THEORIZING FORMS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE

6/11/2013 9:20 AM

691

corporation concept.38 Enabling legislation requires benefit corporations to
frame their public benefit aspirations with respect to a standard developed by a
transparent, independent entity.39 Benefit corporations also must disclose their
public benefit achievements to shareholders and the public with reference to
such a standard.40
Flexible purpose corporations tweak the for-profit corporate model without
recourse to third-party standards. Instead, an FPC is “organized . . . for the
benefit of the long-term and the short-term interests of the flexible purpose
corporation and its shareholders and in furtherance of [one or more]
enumerated purposes” its founders select.41 Special purposes may be either
ones typically pursued by a charity or “promoting positive short-term or longterm effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the
flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the following: (i) [t]he
flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and
creditors[;] (ii) [t]he community and society[;] (iii) [t]he environment.”42 Each
adopting entity must declare its intention to pursue one or more of these special
purposes in its articles of incorporation.43
The first thing social entrepreneurs want from a specialized form is
permission to expose their enterprises’ dual missions. Traditional nonprofit and
for-profit forms of organization miss the mark, while all of the various
specialized forms meet it effectively. Whatever the other problems or
38 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 592, 600–03; J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a
Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions
for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 90–92, 94 (2012); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012).
39 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(5), (8).
Importantly, benefit corporations need not submit to assessment by such a third party. Benefit corporations can
self-assess, but they must use a third party’s metric. For general discussion and critique of the benefit
corporation form, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 25; Callison, supra note 38; and Murray, supra note 38.
40 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1831 (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney Supp.
2012). Benefit LLCs likewise rely upon third-party standards, but tweak the LLC, rather than a corporate,
form. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1101(c).
41 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(1)(A).
42 See id. § 2602(b)(2).
43 See id. § 2602(b). Comprehensive discussion of the FPC form can be found in Dana Brakman Reiser,
The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 55 (2012), and Robert T.
Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Hybrid Corporate Entities in
Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 52–58), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134022. Washington’s
social-purpose corporation statute also looks to founders to declare their social mission, without tax law or
third-party signposts. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.020–.40 (West Supp. 2013); see also Esposito,
supra, at 57–61 (analyzing the social-purpose corporation form).
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shortcomings of an L3C, benefit corporation, or FPC, each begins with a forprofit template and requires its adopters to express their commitment to social
good as well.
II. ACHIEVING DIFFERENCE
Making space to articulate a dual mission is the easy part of designing an
organizational form for social enterprise. Designing a for-profit form that will
achieve social good is much harder. To succeed, governments must do two
things: (1) set a standard for what counts as a true dual-mission entity, and (2)
fashion or enable mechanisms to enforce that standard. This Part and the next
explain how legislative attempts to date have fallen short on these tasks and
suggest how future efforts might do better.
A. A Different Standard: Prioritize Social Good
A government creating a specialized form for social enterprises must set
some baseline standard for accessing it. If a specialized form is to constitute a
separate, third category of organization, it needs some core quality that
differentiates it from traditional for-profit and nonprofit forms. As will be
discussed in more detail below, current specialized forms allow adopting
entities to pursue both profit and social good, but rarely require them to
prioritize one or the other. This generic command to “do both” insufficiently
distinguishes specialized forms from ordinary for-profit entities.
No matter where one falls in the debate over the strength of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, for-profit corporations can certainly produce social
good when it will coincide with producing profits. Legislation in every state
permits for-profit corporations to make charitable contributions.44 These
donations, along with far more extensive corporate social responsibility
programs, have become ubiquitous and go on unchallenged.45 Unincorporated
for-profit entities offer their founders and managers even greater flexibility to
pursue social objectives along with business ones. There is plenty of space for
entities that “do both,” but prioritize profit, under the traditional for-profit
umbrella.46 If specialized forms are to create a meaningful, separate category
44 See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable
Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 970 (1999).
45 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Essay, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2447–49
(2009) (describing pervasiveness of corporate charitable giving and corporate social responsibility programs).
46 Id.
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of social enterprise, adopting entities must meet a baseline standard that
demands something different.
Governments creating specialized forms should require entities adopting
them to prioritize social good in their affairs overall.47 Not every decision that
adopting entities make or every penny they spend must demonstrably prioritize
social good over profit. Unlike a purely for-profit entity, though, a social
enterprise organized using a specialized, government-sponsored form should
be able to show it prioritizes social good as a general matter and over time.48
Some may argue this standard pushes the social enterprise category too
close to the nonprofit pole, as charities are also charged with pursuing their
missions rather than profits for owners. There is a key difference, however. For
nonprofits, social good is not just the priority, it is the sole use to which profits
may be put. By law, nonprofits cannot distribute profits to owners.49 The basic
premise of specialized forms reverses this nondistribution constraint. The
baseline standard I advocate does not disturb permission for entities adopting
specialized forms to pursue profits or to distribute them to owners. It simply
demands that they prioritize social good over profit-focused goals as a general
matter.
True, some founders who view themselves as social entrepreneurs may not
wish to prioritize social good as much as this standard would require. Some
investors may not want to risk their capital with an entity committed to
prioritizing social good over profit.50 Some employees may distrust the
longevity of a company with this commitment; some consumers may doubt the
efficiency of its operations. For them, the universe of for-profit entities “doing
both” remains available and sufficient. To access a specialized social enterprise
form, governments should set prioritization of social good as the required
baseline.
Notice also that my standard leaves social good undefined. I understand
that this term is vague and contested. I leave it open intentionally and
47 In his critique of the benefit corporation, Professor Murray also argued in favor of requiring
prioritization. See Murray, supra note 38, at 27–31. His desire for clear guidance for directors, however, would
likely not be satisfied by my admittedly still-general standard. See id. at 29–31.
48 Importantly, not every entity that currently claims the social enterprise mantle—including, perhaps
some mentioned at the outset of this Article—would meet this more rigorous standard.
49 See supra Part I.A.
50 This limitation on investment could be quite serious. See Chertok et al., supra note 29, at 46 (quoting
Heerad Sabeti, who lamented that social enterprises that are able to attract funding to grow “often do so by
compromising their mission and values in order to satisfy investor demands”).
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inevitably. Allowing individuals the freedom to pursue their own visions of the
social good, rather than one prescribed by fiat, is necessary to produce a
vibrant and pluralistic civil society. Outside minimal requirements of
lawfulness and compliance with public policy, even legal definitions of charity
are extremely capacious.51 Current statutory formulations for social enterprises
follow suit. They treat social good as encompassing traditionally charitable
activity, as well as pursuing the interests of stakeholders as proximate as
employees and as distant as the global environment and society at large.52
Here, early legislation reflects good choices. Founders adopting specialized
forms should have wide discretion to choose the social good they choose to
pursue, but then should be required to differentiate themselves by prioritizing
that social good over profit.
B. Imposing the Standard
Specialized form legislation should impose a clear social-good
prioritization standard on organizations themselves and on the actions of their
leaders. To impose this standard on organizations, statutes should state
unambiguously that the social purposes of adopting entities must trump their
business purposes. To impose it on leaders and managers, legislation should
structure fiduciaries’ duties to require prioritization of social good.
Unfortunately, current legislative efforts rarely do either.
1. Legislating Standards for Adopting Entities
As noted earlier, L3C statutes require an adopting entity to “significantly
further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes”
as defined under the tax code.53 This language requires an L3C to pursue social
good, but not to prioritize it. The legislation also demands that L3Cs “would
51 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (describing the category of exempt organizations as those pursuing
“religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national
or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28 & cmt. f, 29 (2003) (stating that “[c]haritable trust purposes include:
(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d)
the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to
the community” and that charitable trusts are subject to the rule of section 29 that trust purposes and provisions
must not be unlawful or contrary to public policy); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 127 (2004) (describing the long lists of
charitable purposes for which many state nonprofit corporate statutes allow formation and that many also
repeat the provisions of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
52 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (West Supp. 2012).
53 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2012).
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not have been formed but for the company’s relationship to the
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.”54 This seems to
address the founder’s motivation for forming the entity, but again lacks a clear
command to prioritize pursuit of social good. Finally, the statutes warn:
No significant purpose of the entity is the production of income or the
appreciation of property provided, however, that the fact that an
entity produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in
the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of
55
property.

A fair reading of this admittedly confusing language would prohibit an L3C
from prioritizing profit overall. Unfortunately, the somewhat contradictory
provisions in the language undermine even this conclusion. Further, a
prohibition on prioritizing profit still does not affirmatively require an L3C to
prioritize social good.
The other forms fall even shorter, generally adopting an explicit “do both”
approach to corporate purposes. FPCs are formed “to engage in any lawful act
or activity . . . for the benefit of the long-term and the short-term interests of
the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders and in furtherance
of . . . [one or more] enumerated [social-good] purposes.”56 The statute does
not require prioritization of one type of purpose or the other in any way.
Benefit corporations must be formed to pursue a general public benefit but also
can pursue any lawful business purpose. While a benefit corporation may
choose to set its public benefit up as a limit on its business purposes, under all
but one statute this path is optional.57 New York’s statute, which became
effective in 2012 and perhaps signals future legislative improvements in
standard setting, is an important outlier. For New York benefit corporations,
“[t]he purpose to create general public benefit shall be a limitation on the other
purposes of the benefit corporation, and shall control over any inconsistent
purpose of the benefit corporation.”58 This clear command for adopting entities
54

E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii).
E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102(a)(ix)(B) (West Supp. 2012).
56 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
57 See, e.g., id. § 14610(a); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a)(2) (West Supp. 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) (West Supp. 2012).
58 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1706(a) (McKinney Supp. 2012). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a)
(“This purpose is in addition to, and may be a limitation on, its purpose under its certificate of incorporation
and any specific purpose set forth in its certificate of incorporation.” (emphasis added)), with N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 1706(a).
55
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to prioritize social good is commendable and should be emulated in future
legislation.
2. Legislating Standards for Fiduciaries
Legislation creating specialized forms should also impose a patent mandate
that their fiduciaries must prioritize social good. After all, these entities are
legal fictions and can only act through the leaders and managers who operate
them. John Tyler forcefully argued that L3C statutes have done so. In his view:
[They] clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary
priorities:
•

the primary purpose of the L3C operations must prioritize
pursuing charitable, exempt purposes, thereby exalting
charitable purpose above all other purposes; and

•

realizing profit and enhancing value can be purposes of the
enterprise as long as they are not significant purposes,
thereby subordinating profit motive and placing it not just
secondary on the continuum of permissible purposes, but
59
near the extreme end of such continuum.

J. Haskell Murray and Edward Hwang similarly concluded that the L3C’s
purpose language “convey[s] a mandate for an L3C manager to prioritize the
organization’s charitable purpose above all other things and to consider such
priority as a framework for fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.”60 This careful
parsing of the statutory language is surely a reasonable purposive interpretation
by sophisticated experts. But, a standard that social enterprises, their
fiduciaries, and counsel might find in reading between statutory lines is
insufficient. For limitations on fiduciary conduct to differentiate a new
category of specialized forms, they must clearly and explicitly instruct these
leaders to prioritize social good. The brief and muddled mandate L3C statutes
contain does not go nearly this far.61
59

Tyler, supra note 24, at 141 (footnotes omitted).
Murray & Hwang, supra note 35, at 27–28.
61 Callison and Vestal likewise challenged Tyler’s view of the LC3’s requirements for fiduciaries. See
Callison & Vestal, supra note 27, at 286–88. The strange statutory formulation is actually borrowed from
federal tax legislation describing a program-related investment (PRI). A PRI is an investment made by a
private foundation to further its exempt purpose. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006); see also Examples of ProgramRelated Investments by Private Foundations—Proposed Regulations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&Non-Profits/Examples-of-Program-Related-Investments-by-Private-Foundations-%E2%80%93-ProposedRegulations (last updated Nov. 19, 2012). If such an investment meets the tax law requirements now
incorporated into L3C statutes, it will qualify as a PRI, will count toward the foundation’s required annual
60
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Although benefit corporation and FPC statutes discuss the role of directors
in great detail, they do not impose a clear standard requiring fiduciaries to
prioritize social good.62 Benefit corporation language typically includes a
specialized standard for directors’ conduct. In it, directors are instructed to
consider a laundry list of constituencies. For example, under Vermont law:
[Directors] shall, in determining what the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the benefit corporation, consider
the effects of any action or inaction upon:
(A) the shareholders of the benefit corporation;
(B) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and its
subsidiaries and suppliers;
(C) the interests of customers to the extent they are beneficiaries of
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit
corporation;
(D) community and societal considerations, including those of any
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or
its subsidiaries or suppliers are located;
(E) the local and global environment; and
(F) the long-term and short-term interests of the benefit corporation,
including the possibility that those interests may be best served by
63
the continued independence of the benefit corporation.

This language clearly neutralizes any real or perceived shareholder wealth
maximization norm, drawing heavily on constituency statutes. Unlike most
constituency statutes, which only free directors to consider the interests of
various stakeholders, benefit corporation statutes mandate their consideration.
The language does not, however, require directors to prioritize social good. In
fact, benefit corporation statutes frequently reject the idea of prioritization
expressly.64

distributions, and will not trigger penalties as a jeopardizing investment. See id. The L3C was initially
formulated as a vehicle to receive PRIs. See Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs
for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 680 n.4, 682
(2012); Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to Ponder,
35 VT. L. REV. 163, 165 (2010). Nothing in the statute, however, limits it to this use and an early study
suggests it is not the major reason for most L3C adoptions. See id. at 177–78.
62 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 598–600; Callison, supra note 38, at 24–25; Murray, supra note
38, at 27–31.
63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). Many benefit
corporations bestow even greater discretion on benefit corporation directors, who may also consider “any other
pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that the director determines are appropriate to consider.” Id.
§ 21.09(a)(2); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(a)(2)(H) (2012) (using essentially identical language).
64 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1821(A)(3) (2013) (stating that directors “[s]hall not be required
to give priority to the interests of a particular person or group . . . over the interests of any other person or
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Perversely, while this standard seeks to make stakeholder interests more
potent in the boardroom, it may simply give fiduciaries license to do whatever
they want. The familiar concern that constituency statutes in fact act as director
protection is well taken here.65 With such a lengthy list of permissible
considerations and no instruction on prioritization, one can question whether
any standard of conduct for benefit corporation directors evaporates.66
The standard of conduct imposed on FPC directors is quite different, but
still does not require them to treat social good as their priority. The California
legislation expands directors’ discretion to:
consider those factors, and give weight to those factors, as the
director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term
prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the
flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of
67
the flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles.

Thus, directors may consider only the particular special purpose or purposes
identified for their FPC and expressed in its articles of incorporation.68
Notably, consideration of these purposes is permissive, not mandatory.69 While
this FPC language might be characterized as “do both” and compared
favorably to benefit corporation statutes’ instruction to “do everything,” it does
not demand that FPC leaders prioritize social good.
In future iterations, specialized form legislation should provide fiduciaries
with not only discretion, but real guidance. It should state plainly that
fiduciaries of adopting entities are duty-bound to prioritize social good.

group unless” the organization’s articles express a contrary intention); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3)
(rejecting a similar prioritization requirement).
65 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 38 (1991) (“[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the
community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1493
(1992) (“[T]he primary effect of these constituency statutes is simply to enhance managers’ discretion in
responding to hostile takeover bids.”).
66 Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 599–600.
67 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c) (West 2013).
68 See id.
69 See id.
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3. Imposing Standards by Judicial Interpretation
To date, specialized form legislation has seldom included clear mandates
and future legislative efforts may fail to incorporate them.70 Thus, it is
important to consider whether courts will interpret existing concepts of
fiduciary obligation to require social-good prioritization. After all, the
fiduciary duty idea is known and vaunted for its malleability; its meaning and
requirements change with the context in which it is applied.71 If judicial
interpretation can effectively embed social-good prioritization within fiduciary
duty concepts, legislative clarity may not be indispensable.
For-profit organizational forms all impose fiduciary duties of loyalty on
their leaders and vest investors with authority to enforce them.72 For corporate
directors, this duty demands that fiduciaries act with good faith and loyalty, not
putting their personal interests before those of the enterprises they serve.73 Of
course, avoiding self-dealing or unfair competition is likewise necessary for
dutiful service to a social enterprise. But it is not sufficient to train fiduciaries’
attention on prioritizing social good.
Imagine a social enterprise founded to pursue “a cooler, greener planet and
profits for owners by producing clean energy technology.” It needs to choose a
new supplier for the primary input in its sole product. The decision is one of
great magnitude, since the cost of procuring this input represents 75% of the
company’s production expenses. One potential supplier offers the input for a
very low price; the other supplier prices the input considerably higher but
produces it with a smaller carbon footprint. A narrow reading of loyalty
prohibits a fiduciary from sourcing the input from a supplier she controls, at
least if the price agreed upon is above market. Yet it gives her no guidance on
how to balance the competing aims of profit and social good. Traditional
70

See supra Part II.2.
See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 1–6 (2011) (noting fiduciary duty’s application and differing
elements in varying contexts, in a work attempting to define a common core of fiduciary concept); Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Although one
can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force
in different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships.”).
72 In this Part, I draw on for-profit and nonprofit corporate fiduciary law to anticipate how courts might
delineate the duties of fiduciaries of social enterprises taking specialized forms. Still further instruction might
be drawn from LLC law’s concept of good faith and fair dealing or fiduciary concepts applicable in other
forms of organization. I decline to consider additional alternatives here out of concern doing so would make an
already lengthy discussion unwieldy.
73 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 10.9, at 221 (3d ed.
2011).
71
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loyalty concepts will also provide plaintiffs and courts no signposts for
determining when fiduciaries have struck an inappropriate balance. In the
absence of clear legislative mandates, judges will need to expand the idea of
the duty of loyalty beyond these typically narrow quarters for it to spur our
fiduciary to prioritize social good.
Perhaps instead, the duty of care would provide the necessary direction. It
requires fiduciaries to act prudently.74 As they make decisions they must
inform themselves suitably, may rely upon experts as needed, and can delegate
to committees when appropriate.75 Yet these process-oriented indicia of care
will not require fiduciaries to prioritize social good. To do so, the duty of care
would need to include a substantive component beyond mere rationality.76
Judges would need to opine that careful action equates with erring on the side
of social good.
The process-heavy nature of typical care obligations is exacerbated by
application of the business judgment rule. Under this rule, courts defer to
corporate fiduciaries’ nonconflicted, good faith decisions taken with adequate
information. It is drawn from for-profit corporate law, but has been applied to
nonprofit fiduciaries as well.77 Like in the for-profit realm, application of this
rule to nonprofits is based on courts’ professed nonexpertise in their affairs78
and a desire not to discourage fiduciaries from responsible risk taking.79 Unless
legislatively overridden, the business judgment rule will likely be applied to
social enterprises adopting specialized forms for these same reasons.80 Courts
74

See id. § 10.2, at 201.
See id. § 10.4, at 208–12.
76 See id. § 10.5, at 212.
77 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 3 (1987) (“While the application of the
business judgment rule to directors of nonprofit corporations is not firmly established by the case law, its use is
consistent with [the statute].”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 209–11, 226–27 (noting codifications and
judicial support for applying the business judgment rule in the nonprofit context); see also 1 LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9:2 (2008)
(addressing the role of the business judgment rule in LLC managers’ duties of care); Larry E. Ribstein, An
Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 65 (2008)
(criticizing application of the rule to LLCs in part because it “introduces a corporate concept that is an
inappropriate default rule for partnership-type and closely held firms”).
78 Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV.
83, 119 (2004) (“Judges likely have less general business expertise than [for-profit] directors.”).
79 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 210; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit
Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 644 (1998).
80 Murray advocated the application of such a rule, the “purpose judgment rule,” to benefit corporations.
See Murray, supra note 38, at 41. Under it, “only if a director of a benefit corporation consciously failed to
carry out her duties in good faith, knowingly violated the law or prioritized her own self-interest, would the
real possibility of liability exist.” Id.
75
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will have no desire to shackle fiduciaries to crabbed and conservative strategies
alone—the whole idea of specialized forms is to encourage a new and bold
way of thinking about doing business and creating social good.
Recall our fiduciary’s decision whether to source her company’s major
input from the cheaper or greener supplier. She would seem to comply with her
duty of care obligations to inform herself and attend to her duties with
prudence by putting the contract out for bid and selecting the lowest priced bid
from among those the company received. The business judgment rule would
shield her from liability with even less effort. It would defer to the fiduciary’s
choice unless it represented a conflict of interest, lacked good faith, or was
badly uninformed. The traditional duty of care will encourage directors to use
deliberate and conscientious methods when making decisions that pit social
good and profit against each other, which they absolutely should. It will not,
however, tell them to prioritize social good.
Courts might reach beyond narrow understandings of loyalty or care to
impose a social-good prioritization standard. For example, courts could
interpret good faith differently for specialized form fiduciaries. The meaning of
good faith has been much discussed in recent commentary on Delaware
corporate caselaw.81 Until Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,
some commentators even argued it constituted an independent, third category
of directors’ fiduciary obligation.82 Stone rejected that position and sited good
faith firmly within the ambit of the duty of loyalty.83 Directors must act in
good faith to meet their loyalty obligations, but a showing of lack of good faith
alone will not ground liability.84 Given the flexibility of fiduciary duty law
generally, and the lack of Delaware dominance in social enterprise law, there is

81 See, e.g., Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware
Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531
(2005); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); Charles W. Murdock, Fairness and Good Faith as a Precept in the Law
of Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551 (2005); John L. Reed & Matt
Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware
Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004).
82 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3
(2006); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494 (2004); see also Leo E. Strine,
Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629
(2010) (detailing, and critiquing, this debate).
83 See 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
84 See id.
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no need for courts addressing specialized forms to follow this narrow path. If
legislation does not impose a fiduciary duty to prioritize social good explicitly,
courts can interpret good faith in this context to require it.
The duty of obedience offers courts another pathway by which they can
impose a mandate to prioritize social good. Although the duty of obedience in
modern for-profit corporate law is typically understood primarily to require
regulatory compliance,85 many commentators argue a more expansive duty of
obedience constrains the work of nonprofit fiduciaries.86 In their view, “the
duty of obedience requires that a director act with fidelity, within the bounds of
the law generally, to the organization’s ‘mission,’ as expressed in its charter
and by-laws.”87 Commentators debate whether obedience is a separate and
independent duty of nonprofit directors, but even those who dispute its
existence as a separate duty agree nonprofit fiduciaries must adhere to
purposes of the entities they serve.88 If legislatures fail to directly impose a

85 See Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460–61
(2010–2011). Fiduciary duties requiring obedience can also be found in agency law and trust law. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007) (recognizing a trustee’s “duty to administer the trust . . . in
accordance with [its terms] and applicable law”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (noting
agent’s “duty to take action only within the scope of the agent’s actual authority” and to “comply with all
lawful instructions received from the principal”); id. § 1.01 & cmt. f; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51,
at 225–26 (discussing obedience in the context of private and charitable trusts); Megan Wischmeier Shaner,
Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66
BUS. LAW. 27, 44–46 (2010) (discussing the duty of obedience in agency law in an article arguing for its
application to corporate officers).
86 See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84–86 (1988)
(articulating the duty of obedience as such and explaining its demands on nonprofit fiduciaries); Rob Atkinson,
Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008) (offering an expansive review of the
duty of obedience across corporate and trust contexts); Palmiter, supra note 85, at 466–69 (summarizing the
duty’s requirements); see also Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern
Nonprofit Governance Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) (arguing that a separate duty of
obedience for nonprofit fiduciaries is needed); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 904–05, 919–27 (2007)
(advocating reinvigoration of a requirement of nonprofit fiduciaries’ obedience to mission as a duty of
fidelity).
87 KURTZ, supra note 86, at 21; see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d
575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure that
the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has been referred to as the ‘duty of
obedience.’”).
88 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 300 cmt. g, 320 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007) (articulating such an obligation without approving a separate duty of obedience); FREMONTSMITH, supra note 51, at 225–26 (arguing obedience to mission is appropriately seen as a component of the
duty of loyalty); Goldschmid, supra note 79, at 641 (arguing obedience to mission is appropriately seen as a
component of the duty of care).
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duty to prioritize social good on specialized form fiduciaries, courts can hold
such prioritization is an inherent requirement of their duty of obedience.
This might be easiest in an FPC, whose articles will dedicate the entity to at
least one special purpose. For other types of entities, formative documents may
speak in very general terms, offering little guidance to fiduciaries, litigants,
and courts. Analogous obstacles arise and have been overcome, however, in
charitable entities; organizational documents can say little about mission and
modern charters often permit the organization to pursue “any lawful
purpose.”89 Of course, even if purpose language is very specific, obedience to
it should not be slavish. Like charities, to be effective, social enterprises often
will need to evolve over time to meet society’s changing needs.90
Consider again our supply-chain decision. Our fiduciary will have an easier
time choosing a supplier if specialized forms contain a social-good
prioritization mandate—a sort of tiebreaker for close cases. She can safely
select the greener supplier, erring on the side of furthering the entity’s
environmental mission. Of course, this does not mean these fiduciaries will
face no hard choices. Real decisions may not be this stark, such as if the entity
was also founded to serve the local community and the greener vendor
operated out of state.
Nor does a mandate to prioritize social good rob fiduciaries of all their
discretion. It bears repeating that not every decision fiduciaries make must
demonstrably further social good. The requirement is to make social good the
organization’s priority as a general matter. In decisions of smaller impact for
the entity, profit-seeking outcomes can be favored. Furthermore, fiduciaries
can pursue subtler solutions as long as they fit within an overall prioritization
of social good. Even on this major vendor decision, fiduciaries might
appropriately decide to source some of their supply from the cheaper vendor.
Or, perhaps, awarding the contract to the cheaper, emitting vendor is justified
here because of recent major decisions pursuing environmental gains. A
command to prioritize social good hardly turns fiduciaries into do-gooding
robots, reflexively taking every decision in furtherance of social mission,
89

See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 510 (1981).
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 300 cmt. g, 320 cmt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2007); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 225–26; Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability:
Applying the Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND
NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK 41, 48–49 (Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash eds.,
2010).
90
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damning the consequences for investors. It does, however, provide a baseline
of content to help fiduciaries resolve otherwise paralyzing dilemmas.
There is no caselaw on these questions to date, but when cases arise courts
should use these or other interpretive vehicles to impose a clear social-good
prioritization standard. As discussed above,91 I disagree with Tyler’s view that
“the L3C statutes clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary
priorities.”92 I agree, however, that social-good prioritization would be a fair
gloss for courts to apply to L3C statutes. It could also be easily read into the
fiduciary duties of New York benefit corporations, whose social-good
purposes control over any other inconsistent objectives. For other explicitly
“do both” statutes, courts would need to be somewhat more aggressive, but
would be acting within a long tradition of common law fiduciary duty
interpretation.
C. Conclusion
Taking New York’s lead, specialized form legislation should clearly state
that only social enterprises that prioritize social good may adopt the specialized
forms they enable. It should also definitively bind their fiduciaries to prioritize
social good. If legislation fails to do so, courts should take up the cause as they
interpret the fiduciary obligations of social enterprise leaders over time.
This social-good prioritization standard will not ensure that every adopting
entity will meet everyone’s standards for a good, socially conscious,
responsible, or green company. Individual entities are free to promise they will
do more.93 And, investors, employees, and customers are free to demand more
from those companies with whom they associate. But, requiring adopting
entities to prioritize social good will identify them as meaningfully distinct
from ordinary for-profits. Their ability to distribute profits to owners will mark
them as importantly different from nonprofits.94 Imposing this standard will
91

Supra Part II.B.2.
Tyler, supra note 24, at 141.
93 Ordinary antifraud provisions may be used to police these claims. Cf. Tyler, supra note 24, at 156
(describing the potential use of fraud claims to police failures by L3C fiduciaries to prioritize charitable goals).
94 Note this definition is widely found in the business literature on social enterprise. See, e.g., FRANK
MARTIN & MARCUS THOMPSON, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE BUSINESSES 5–6 (2010)
(noting “[t]he most common definition that appears in texts written about social enterprise” in the United
Kingdom is “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are reinvested for that purpose in the
business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and
owners”); JANE WEI-SKILLERN ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR 4 (2007) (stating in a
business school text that for social enterprises “[t]he creation of social value takes precedence over the creation
92
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differentiate those entities adopting specialized forms as part of a new and
significant category, assuming it can be enforced. The next Part examines this
pivotal assumption.
III. ENFORCING THE STANDARD
A social-good prioritization standard will have only expressive value unless
specialized form legislation also establishes mechanisms for enforcing it.
Recent enactments offer many insights on how to shape enforcement. This Part
goes beyond those extant examples, however, to develop a typology of
enforcement mechanisms upon which specialized forms might rely. These
include mechanisms that look within adopting entities for enforcement
resources, as well as mechanisms that pursue enforcement externally, through
public or even private regulators.
In situations where enforcement is suboptimal, self-regulation regimes
often develop if enforcement is of value to the relevant industry. Social
entrepreneurs’ own interest in achieving their social missions and branding
their entities as truly different may motivate them to find their own methods of
enforcement. They could define goals and limitations on their enterprises’
activities in partnership, operating, or shareholder agreements.95 They could
maintain a controlling ownership position for themselves or a trusted few.96
They could adopt a financing structure that locks themselves and investors into
a pact to prioritize social good.97 These options may eventually create
limitations on scale, but can be effective for many if not most social enterprises
even for the long term. Still, they are individual responses, not ones compelled
or even driven by organizational form.

of personal shareholder or stakeholder wealth”); Sabeti, supra note 9, at 99 (explaining in the Harvard
Business Review that social enterprises “generate earned income but give top priority to an explicit social
mission”). For a more detailed discussion of the business literature’s use of the terms social enterprise and
social entrepreneurship, see J. GREGORY DEES, THE MEANING OF “SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP” (2001),
available at http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees_sedef.pdf. In this influential white paper, Dees noted
that for social entrepreneurs, “[m]ission-related impact becomes the central criterion, not wealth creation.” Id.
at 2.
95 See Callison & Vestal, supra note 27, at 286–88 (describing this strategy in the LLC context); see also,
e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2010) (granting shareholders broad discretion in crafting shareholder
agreements to fit their needs, even in many situations otherwise “inconsistent” with the Act’s provisions).
96 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 17–19 (describing retaining control with owners sympathetic to
a social enterprise’s social missions as a strategy for maintaining it).
97 See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Financial
Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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For a specialized form for social enterprise to lead social entrepreneurs to
achieve social mission, the form itself must provide a ready answer to the
enforcement question. None of the current forms have yet accomplished this.
There are clear legislative or judicial paths for establishing a social-good
prioritization standard. Establishing effective enforcement mechanisms is more
difficult, yet legislators and social entrepreneurs must meet this challenge for
specialized forms to succeed.
A. Enforcement from Within
Legislation creating specialized forms could empower one or more groups
within adopting entities to engage in enforcement activity. The first line of
defense is self-discipline by organizational leaders. Many fiduciaries will strive
to meet the obligations the law imposes, even without a serious threat of
enforcement, provided they understand the law’s limits.98 The concern about
understanding what the law requires is especially serious in the benefit
corporation, where the sheer number of mandatory considerations for
fiduciaries may be overwhelming. But L3C and FPC directors also lack
guidelines on how to handle the inevitable moments when profit and social
good conflict. The structure of L3C legislation might provide attentive
fiduciaries some clues. The FPC statute’s limitation on the universe of
potential social goods FPC directors can consider also offers directors some
moorings.99 Still, the essential “do both” approach adopted by all of these
forms offers fiduciaries little guidance. A clear standard prioritizing social
good would improve fiduciaries’ ability to self-police.
1. Investor Enforcement
Specialized forms need not rely, however, solely on fiduciaries’ good
intentions. They may also inform, empower, and incentivize investors and
other stakeholders to enforce social-good prioritization. Current forms
prominently feature private enforcement by investors, arming them with an
array of informational, voting, and litigation rights. This subsection canvasses

98 See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
519, 524 (2012) (arguing that the unenforced duty “is a meaningful concept because people obey the law for
many different reasons, and not simply out of fear of punishment”).
99 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c) (West 2013) (permitting directors to look to “those factors, and give
weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term prospects of the
flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the
purposes of the flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles”).
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these investor rights—and other rights future legislation might consider—and
evaluates their potential to enforce a standard of social-good prioritization.
a. Informational Rights
Information is a precondition for effective investor enforcement. Without
knowledge of how fiduciaries are undertaking their roles, and in particular how
they are handling the inevitable conflicts between profit and social good, even
empowered and motivated investors will have little enforcement impact.
Traditional for-profit forms recognize investors’ need for information and
entitle them to information about the conduct of a business.100 These basic
informational rights can, and frequently have, been carried over to specialized
forms.
In profit-focused entities, the information investors receive naturally
emphasizes business outcomes and profit forecasts, explaining their expected
impact on investor earnings. This content must be adjusted to empower
investors in social enterprises. These investors still need information about
profit, but they also need information about how an enterprise is pursuing
social good and balancing these goals. Moreover, they need not only
information on outcomes, but also some visibility into entities’ decisionmaking processes, especially when profit and social good come into conflict.
The benefit corporation and FPC statutorily expand disclosure to investors in
this fashion.
All benefit corporation statutes require adopting entities to distribute to
their shareholders an annual “benefit report” and post it on their public
website, if one exists.101 This report must describe “[t]he ways in which the
100 Basic financial reports must be disclosed upon investor request and, for a proper purpose, investors
must be given access to the company’s books and records. Information will also be provided at shareholder,
member, or partnership meetings in preparation for director elections or other shareholder votes. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West Supp. 2012). The Model Business Corporation Act also requires those
regulated by it to distribute annual financial statements to shareholders. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20
(2010). But see COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.6, at 354 (explaining that “the response of state legislatures
was not favorable” to this Model Act feature but that the federal securities laws served the same purpose for
public companies). For disclosure duties in LLCs, see generally 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 77, § 9:5,
which notes that “[a]n LLC manager probably has no ongoing affirmative duty to disclose developments
concerning the LLC to the members in the absence of some transaction or event, including a demand for
information, which would lead the member to expect disclosure.” Where they apply, investors may also obtain
information about the companies in which they invest from disclosures mandated by federal and state
securities laws. COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.6, at 354.
101 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)–(c); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708(a)–(c) (McKinney Supp.
2012).
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benefit corporation pursued a general public benefit during the year and the
extent to which the general public benefit was created,” along with “[a]ny
circumstances that have hindered the creation by the benefit corporation of the
public benefit.”102 In addition, the report must assess the entity’s performance
with respect to its chosen third-party standard.103 Some benefit corporation
enabling acts also mandate that adopting entities seat a “benefit director” to
“prepare . . . a statement whether, in the opinion of the benefit director, the
benefit corporation acted in accordance with its general, and any specific,
public benefit purpose in all material respects during the period covered by the
report” for inclusion in the annual report.104 Also, “[i]f in the opinion of the
benefit director the benefit corporation . . . failed to act in accordance with its
public benefit purpose, then the statement of the benefit director shall include a
description of the ways in which the benefit corporation or its directors or
officers failed to act.”105 The basic benefit report disclosures are primarily
outcome based. Required reporting on obstacles to achieving social good and
the opinion of benefit directors, though, can give investors insight on the
profit–social-good tradeoffs their benefit corporations have made in a given
year and over time.
California’s FPC statute goes even further, requiring boards to send
shareholders two-part annual disclosures and post them publicly when
confidentiality is not a barrier.106 The two parts track the dual mission of an
FPC. The first part addresses financial performance, including a current
balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cashflows, along with an
independent accountant’s report or officer’s validating certificate.107 The
contents of the second part are highly scripted and require comprehensive
reporting on an FPC’s achievement of its chosen special purpose or purposes.
This part of the annual report must include:
102

MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a)(1)(i), (iii) (West Supp. 2012); see, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(1)(a), (c) (West Supp. 2012) (similar); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-500 (Supp. 2012)
(similar).
103 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(a)(2) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2)(a) (West Supp.
2012).
104 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38410(c)(1).
105 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 11(c)(3) (West Supp.
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (West Supp. 2012). These same enactments permit the benefit
corporation to appoint a “benefit officer” to prepare the annual benefit report. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
40/4.15(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(B)(2) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9.
106 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b).
107 Id. § 3500(a). Benefit corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders need not comply with generally
accepted accounting principles in their financial statements. Id. § 3502(g).
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Identification and discussion of the short-term and long-term
objectives of the flexible purpose corporation relating to its
special purpose or purposes, and an identification and
explanation of any changes made in those special purpose
objectives during the fiscal year.
Identification and discussion of the material actions taken by
the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year to
achieve its special purpose objectives, the impact of those
actions, including the causal relationships between the actions
and the reported outcomes, and the extent to which those
actions achieved the special purpose objectives for the fiscal
year.
Identification and discussion of material actions, including the
intended impact of those actions, that the flexible purpose
corporation expects to take in the short term and long term
with respect to achievement of its special purpose objectives.
A description of the process for selecting, and an identification
and description of, the financial, operating, and other measures
used by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year
for evaluating its performance in achieving its special purpose
objectives, including an explanation of why the flexible
purpose corporation selected those measures and identification
and discussion of the nature and rationale for any material
changes in those measures made during the fiscal year.
Identification and discussion of any material operating and
capital expenditures incurred by the flexible purpose
corporation during the fiscal year in furtherance of achieving
the special purpose objectives, a good faith estimate of any
additional material operating or capital expenditures the
flexible purpose corporation expects to incur over the next
three fiscal years in order to achieve its special purpose
objectives, and other material expenditures of resources
incurred by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal
year, including employee time, in furtherance of achieving the
special purpose objectives, including a discussion of the extent
to which that capital or use of other resources serves purposes
other than and in addition to furthering the achievement of the
108
special purpose objectives.

108 Id. § 3500(b). In addition to these wide-ranging required annual reports, an FPC’s board must make an
interim report to shareholders if it decides to change or abandon one of its special purposes or if it changes its
planned expenditures toward its special purposes from those stated in the most recent annual report. Id. § 3501.
This obligation applies whether the change is to make a new expenditure or decline to make one previously
planned, though it does not include changes in director or officer compensation alone. Id.
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FPC disclosures will thus provide investors information not only on profit and
social-good outcomes, but also significant information on the process of
reaching them. This window into decision making can arm investors with
important data to use in enforcing social-good prioritization.
Compliance with these disclosure requirements may also be prohibitively
expensive. The statute’s drafters anticipated this concern, and included a
statutory explanation that directors need not provide every detail of their
actions and decisions, but only “use their discretion” and “provid[e] . . . the
reasonable detail that a reasonable investor would consider important in
understanding the corporation’s objectives, actions, impacts, measures,
rationale, and results of operations as they relate to the nature and achievement
of the special purpose objectives.”109 Further, when and if best practices
emerge for such reports, compliance with them will raise a rebuttable
presumption that all required information was provided.110 If this leeway is
insufficient, the legislation gives many FPCs an easy way out of the specialpurpose reporting obligation altogether. All required reports on special purpose
can be waived by a two-thirds vote of the FPC’s shareholders if an FPC has
fewer than 100 of them.111 Although the FPC statute’s disclosure requirements
are quite comprehensive, it remains to be seen how widely used they will be.
Finally, informational rights and any additional enforcement mechanisms
predicated on the disclosures they provide raise concerns about the utility of
the performance measures they utilize. When success cannot be measured by a
pure financial bottom line, assessing and reporting performance will be
difficult and contested.112 In an organization with dual purposes to pursue
profit and social good, it will be easier to focus on and report financial

109

Id. § 3502(a).
Id. § 3502(b).
111 Id. § 3502(h).
112 See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory
Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 191 (2012) (lamenting that for nonprofits “performance measurement is an
unsolved metric”); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753,
787–92 (2011) (elaborating on the many reasons why “measurement in the social sector is immensely
complicated”). These problems have long been understood as a challenge for the nonprofit sector. See, e.g.,
Patrice Flynn & Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Measuring the Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in MEASURING
THE IMPACT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3, 15 (Patrice Flynn & Virginia A. Hodgkinson eds., 2001); Rosabeth
Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement
in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154, 154–59 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
110
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outcomes.113 Many organizations are currently working to develop better social
performance measures for use by nonprofits as well as social enterprises, but
these are far from perfect.114 The problems of creating and using these metrics
will complicate any enforcement mechanism for social enterprise, and in large
part this complication cannot be avoided.
b. Management Rights
Assuming investors obtain information that alerts them to failures to
prioritize social good, the next important question in evaluating their
enforcement capacity is: what actions can they take? Investors might engage
directly in management and decision making, participate through voting for
representatives or on business decisions, or be given standing to sue managers
for failures to appropriately prioritize social good. The extent to which each of
these paths is open to investors under current social enterprise forms depends
on the incorporated or unincorporated nature of the entity and, in
unincorporated entities, on the governance arrangement adopted by the parties.
The benefit corporation and FPC forms adopt the fundamental precept of
for-profit corporation law that management is centralized and separated from
investors.115 Together with officers and employees, benefit corporation and
FPC directors make everyday decisions and initiate extraordinary transactions.
Shareholders’ participation is limited to electing directors and approving major
organic changes like mergers, sales of all or substantially all assets, or
dissolutions. Centralized management can have great advantages. Specialist
managers offer expertise and efficiency and free investors from the demands
full participation would make on their time and energy.116 Yet, unless

113 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 45, at 2464–65 (discussing the special challenges of applying social
performance measures in a blended-mission environment).
114 See Murray, supra note 38, at 31–32 (discussing these efforts); see also Esposito, supra note 43, at 69–
70 (describing metrics available to assess social and environmental impact).
115 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2006) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). Scholars across the
ideological spectrum accept the point that directions like this place everyday management of corporate affairs
outside the hands of shareholders. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 65 (recognizing this facet of current law in
the context of a reform proposal to permit shareholders to initiate at least some corporate actions); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of
Law Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-06, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=299743 (arguing for the value of this and even broader director autonomy).
116 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744–46 (2006); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1656 (2001).
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specialized corporate forms expand shareholders’ role, investors will lack
statutory authority to weigh in on the everyday tradeoffs between profit and
social good at the point of decision. Shareholders, as such, simply will not be
consulted.
That said, when an incorporated social enterprise is closely held, reality
may contradict statutory form because shareholders and directors will likely
overlap. Some of the value of centralized management is lost, but greater
investor control is gained and can be used as an enforcement tool. Through
their participation in management, these investors will have significant access
to the decision-making process. They can monitor and compel compliance with
a mandate to prioritize social mission. At first blush, this seems like good news
for investor enforcement through management, as most social enterprises will
be—or at least will start—small.117 Thus far, though, drafters of incorporated
forms for social enterprises have not envisioned this kind of role for investors
in closely held entities. Benefit corporation statutes are generally silent on the
issue.118 When the FPC statute singles out adopting entities with few
shareholders, it is to limit the disclosure obligations due to them.119 The statute
neither requires nor exhorts closely held FPC shareholders to enforce socialgood prioritization through their participation in management.
Specialized form legislation might also carve out a more meaningful
decision-making role for investors by modeling unincorporated forms, which
lack the commitment to centralized management. As a default, “[e]ach partner
has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business”120
and limited liability companies are managed by their members.121
Unincorporated social enterprise forms could engage investors in enforcement

117 See Jim Schorr, Social Enterprise 2.0: Moving Toward a Sustainable Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV., Summer 2006, at 12, 12 (“[T]he vast majority of these [social enterprise] businesses are inherently
small . . . .”).
118 Only a few jurisdictions contemplate closely held benefit corporations in their legislative text. See 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.05(e) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that closely held benefit corporations must
designate a party with the “powers, duties, rights, and immunities of a benefit director” among those who act
as a board); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(e) (West Supp. 2012) (similar); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 3338-120(C) (Supp. 2012) (noting that benefit corporations may be subject to the state’s law governing close
corporations).
119 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3502(h) (West 2013) (allowing FPCs with fewer than 100 shareholders to
avoid the statute’s disclosure requirements if two-thirds of the shares vote to waive this obligation).
120 REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(f) (1997); see also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e)
(1914) (providing only slightly different language that “[a]ll partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business”).
121 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 1.11[4], at 31.
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as conflicts between profit and social good arise in daily decisions. Imagine
again our clean energy social enterprise’s vendor selection. If incorporated,
shareholders would not be involved in making this type of decision, except in
the case when shareholders are also directors. In contrast, partners or LLC
members engaged in management could weigh in on this choice.
Importantly, though, investor management in unincorporated business
entities is a default, not a demand. Where incorporated forms prize centralized
management, unincorporated ones prize flexibility.122 The L3C and benefit
LLC follow suit. Investor management remains a waivable default; flexibility
is their hallmark.123 Without a major deviation from this path, specialized
unincorporated forms will hold out the possibility of investor enforcement
through management, but no certainty.
c. Voting Rights
Specialized form legislation could also enfranchise investors to enforce a
mandate to prioritize social good. For example, motivated investors might use
social-good prioritization as a crucible to determine their favored candidate in
director elections. Benefit corporation and FPC shareholders elect directors in
precisely the manner found in for-profit corporations.124 For voting to be an
effective enforcement tool, however, investors need to vote and they need
candidate choices. “[T]raditional shareholders wield their voting power
infrequently at best.”125 Even assuming specialized form investors would vote
more, only in the rare contested election could votes potentially be used to
penalize failures to prioritize social good.126 Similar dynamics will occur in a
social enterprise structured like a manager-managed LLC.

122 See Brewer, supra note 61, at 680 (noting the attractive “inherent contract-like flexibility” of LLCs);
David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 627, 652 (2012) (“[A]s is widely known, the limited liability company frees those managing it and
conducting its business and affairs from the detailed prescriptions and required [corporate] formalities . . . .”).
123 See ROBERT LANG, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., THE L3C & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2010), available at
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/The%20L3C%20&%20Economic%20Developmen
t.pdf (“The L3C was built on the LLC structure in order to provide the flexibility of membership and
organization needed to cover a wide variety of social enterprise situations.”); Kelley, supra note 9, at 370–75.
124 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 9.1, at 152 (explaining that shareholders traditionally elect
directors); id. § 13.17, at 371 (“The prevailing default rule for the election of directors is that directors are
elected under a plurality voting system . . . .”).
125 Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for Corporations Seeking to
Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 226 (2004).
126 Where shareholders and directors overlap significantly, voting will have little more enforcement
impact than the participation of investors themselves in decision making.
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Investors could also use voting on fundamental transactions to enforce
social-good prioritization. Even though management initiates and negotiates
major events in the life of an enterprise, legislation often requires investors to
approve them.127 One can easily imagine fundamental transactions structured
to abandon pursuit of social good, or rebalance it with profit in a way that
undermines the social-good prioritization standard. If investors must approve
these transactions, voting can be used to enforce the priority of social purposes.
Investors can use their approval rights for legacy protection by refusing to
approve a dissolution that would snuff out the entity’s social mission or a
transaction that would diminish or eradicate its commission to social good.128
That said, voting rights on fundamental transactions will not afford investors
opportunities to challenge the many interim decisions that trade off profit and
social good.
Benefit corporation and FPC statutes subject various fundamental
transactions to shareholder approval, often by a two-thirds majority.129 Article
amendments that reprioritize mission, transactions that sell all assets to a forprofit entity, or deals that merge with one, must all pass muster with
investors.130 Investors in these forms can, at least in theory, enforce against
actions that threaten the ultimate existence of their enterprises, and thus their
commitments to social good. The practical utility of shareholder voting,
however, may undermine the power of this enforcement tool, and it will apply
only in endgame situations.

127 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.1, at 350 (noting one aspect of shareholders’ right to vote “as
to the making of amendments to the charter and other fundamental changes in the corporate existence”).
128 See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 95–97 (2010)
(describing the legacy problem as “[t]he risk that the for-profit social enterprise may subordinate social
mission to profits . . . following a change in ownership” and citing Susan Mac Cormac).
129 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3000(b), 3100(a), 3201, 3301(a)(2) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-3(a) (West Supp. 2012). L3C statutes leave LLC default member-approval rights unchanged.
130 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3201; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. AND ASS’NS §§ 2-604(e), 5-6C-04(b)
(West Supp. 2012) (noting that “[t]he proposed amendment shall be approved by the stockholders of the
corporation by the affirmative vote of two thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast on the matter,” which must
be complied with under section 5-6C-04(b)). This same level of shareholder approval is required for an
ordinary for-profit to transform into a benefit corporation by charter amendment. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
AND ASS’NS § 5-6C-03(b).
The California benefit corporation and FPC statutes also provide shareholders with dissenters’ rights.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(a); see also id. § 3305 (providing dissenters’ rights under section 1300 in
transactions converting an FPC into another type of business entity); id. § 14604(d) (granting dissenters’ rights
on sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of a benefit corporation’s assets). For a discussion
challenging the utility of dissenters’ rights in this context, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 43.
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d. Litigation Rights
Legislation can grant investors standing to litigate nonexistential threats to
social mission, and it has frequently done so. Of course, the value of litigation
rights in enforcing social-good prioritization will depend largely on resolving
the serious fiduciary duty issues addressed above and on courts’ institutional
competence to judge compliance with a social-good prioritization standard.131
Assuming these challenges can be met, however, investors will likely have
standing to enforce them.
For-profit corporation statutes authorize shareholders to sue fiduciaries
derivatively on behalf of their corporations by alleging breach of duty.132 Most
LLC statutes confer similar rights.133 L3C and FPC legislation leaves these
existing rights essentially undisturbed.134
Many benefit corporation statutes, however, create a specialized “benefit
enforcement proceeding.”135 Such proceedings may be brought by the
corporation or derivatively by a shareholder, director, a percentage of
beneficial owners, or others the articles identify.136 The statutes often describe
this new proceeding as an exclusive remedy for challenging benefit directors’
unique duties.137 Yet, beyond limiting plaintiffs, benefit legislation contains
few details on how it will operate.

131

See supra Part II.B.2–3.
COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 15.2, at 443 (“As a rule, the shareholder’s judicial remedy for
mismanagement or other wrongful acts of directors, officers, or third parties is by a derivative or representative
suit on behalf of the corporation.”).
133 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 77, § 10:3 (“The derivative remedy is explicitly made available
by most LLC statutes. Most of these statutes provide for rules similar to those applied to corporate derivative
suits. Even where the right is not available by statute, courts have recognized the remedy . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)); see also id. app. 10-2, at 231 (providing state-by-state analysis).
134 LLC and Benefit L3C statutes do not address derivative litigation specifically. The FPC does so, but
applies typical requirements like contemporaneous ownership, demand on the board, and security for
expenses. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2900.
135 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1825 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 14 (West Supp.
2012).
136 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(B) (West
Supp. 2012).
137 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(a) (“No person may bring an action or assert a claim against a
benefit corporation or its directors or officers under this chapter except in a benefit enforcement proceeding.”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(A) (“The duties of directors and officers under this article, the obligation of a
benefit corporation to prepare and make available the annual benefit report . . . and the general and any special
public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation may be enforced only in a benefit enforcement proceeding.”).
For additional discussion of the benefit enforcement proceeding, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at
605–06; Callison, supra note 38, at 12–13, 28; and Murray, supra note 38, at 34–35.
132
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If these claims will operate on a footing similar to for-profit shareholder
derivative suits, obstacles to investor enforcement are numerous and wellknown.138 Derivative plaintiffs must often survive challenging demand
conditions, pleading standards, and bond requirements.139 Moreover, they must
overcome the collective action problem inherent in derivative litigation. When
each shareholder stands to gain only a few dollars or pennies, while her shares
will increase in value after a successful suit, her incentive to litigate is low.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys can help overcome this collective action problem when
their fees can be paid out of an aggregated recovery. Yet it is doubtful that
lawyers will solve benefit corporation investors’ coordination difficulties
because the redress available through such suits is quite limited. Either in their
sections on director obligations or the provisions on benefit enforcement
proceedings, benefit corporation statutes severely limit directors’ monetary
liability for failures to “create a general or specific public benefit.”140 Perhaps
directors may still be held liable for failure to pursue such benefits, but it is
difficult to imagine how such damages would be calculated and the statutes are
silent on this question. Without money damages to fund contingency fee
litigation (and possibly even with it) or provisions for attorneys’ fees, it is
unlikely an aggressive plaintiffs bar will develop in this area.
e. Incentives
Finally, even assuming the content of fiduciary duty could be sufficiently
settled to operate as a real constraint and that the information, management,
voting, and litigation rights investors possess are sufficient, they may lack
adequate incentives to police social-good prioritization effectively. Investors’
preferences will not always track social-good priority precisely. We can
assume that when an investor chooses to put her resources into an entity
adopting a specialized form with a clear social-good prioritization standard,
she shares this preference.141 But investors’ preferences are not static.

138 See Fairfax, supra note 125, at 221–25 (describing how “procedural and substantive rules blunt the
force of [shareholder litigation]”).
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(c) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(C)(2) (similar);
see also Murray, supra note 38, at 34–35.
141 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law
Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 252–54 (2012).
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Economic fortunes may turn and investors who once were pleased to give up
some financial returns for psychic ones may no longer be willing to do so.142
Additionally, unless transfer is restricted by organizational form or
contractual choice, investors may be persuaded to sell to others with differing
views—at least as long as buyers believe they can change the entity’s
course.143 Different statutory formulations allow such buyers more or less
challenging exit routes. Under benefit corporation and FPC statutes, buyers
will have to vote in friendly directors and persuade two-thirds of the shares to
abandon social-good prioritization.144 For L3Cs, the course is far smoother. All
its managers (or owners instructing managers) must do is abandon their
charitable or educational purposes, and the entity instantaneously transforms
into an ordinary LLC.145 Neither disillusioned investors, nor those with a
windfall in their sights, are good candidates to police deviations from socialgood prioritization.
Even for investors who remain committed to prioritizing social good, when
faced with a social enterprise veering off the rails, active enforcement may be a
very unattractive option. If the cost of enforcement activity is high, as will
often be the case if litigation is required, investors might rather give up on the
social mission of a given entity. If coordination problems keep them from
working together to bear these high costs, individual investors might prefer to
exit by liquidating their positions and looking for new socially responsible
investments. Even if they do not exit by cashing out, investors will not
necessarily opt to enforce. If the social enterprise has become more thoroughly
profit seeking, they might opt to stay invested, enjoy the greater profits, and
contribute these to other social-good-producing entities.
2. Non-Investor Stakeholder Enforcement
Of course, investors are not the only stakeholder group that specialized
forms might recruit to enforce social-good prioritization. Employees,
142 Tyler noted these potential problems undermine the ability of investors to enforce L3C obligations
alone. See Tyler, supra note 24, at 155–56. He argued, however, that sufficient additional enforcement can be
provided by civil or criminal suits by attorneys general alleging fraud or misrepresentation, reinvigorated ultra
vires claims, or veil piercing, and opposesd public regulation or enforcement of social enterprises. Id. at 156–
57. He also noted that “[s]uccess [d]oes [n]ot [n]eed to be [r]emedied.” Id. at 158.
143 Social enterprises might be particularly ripe takeover targets; so long as insurgents can re-chart the
entities’ dual mission course toward profit alone, they can quickly cut costs and reap large gains. See
Plerhoples, supra note 141, at 233–36.
144 See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 97 (manuscript at 14).
145 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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consumers, beneficiaries, or even the public at large could also be deployed.
For any private stakeholder to enforce social-good prioritization, either
individually or as part of a coordinated group, she will need at least three
things. First, she must have access to information about the social enterprise’s
outcomes and decision making to understand if enforcement is needed.
Second, she requires tools such as management, voting, or litigation rights to
raise challenges when she feels the entity has gone off track. Third, like all
other potential enforcers, she needs appropriate incentives to engage actively in
enforcement rather than sitting passively on the sidelines.
The current social enterprise forms provide relatively little instruction on
how to empower and utilize non-investor stakeholders in enforcement, as none
go beyond providing these groups with information. The benefit corporation
and FPC forms’ public disclosure requirements offer essentially the same data
to all stakeholder groups.146 The L3C contains no disclosure requirements, and
so in its own way it also provides informational parity. No existing form
equips non-investor stakeholders with management, voting, or litigation rights
to enforce social-good prioritization. In fact, statutes creating these forms often
expressly state their intention not to grant standing to groups beyond
investors.147 Thus, the task here is to envision creatively how an organizational
form might use these other individuals and groups with a stake in the social
enterprise as enforcement resources.
In terms of information, social enterprise employees will have the
advantage of proximity, and often expertise, over all other stakeholder
groups—at times even over investors. Employees can have unparalleled access
to more detailed data, organizational leaders of whom they might ask

146 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 15–16 (West
Supp. 2012). Hawaii requires benefit corporations to make drafts of their benefit reports available for a sixtyday public comment period. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b) (2012).
147 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.01(d) (West Supp. 2012) (“A director does not have a duty
to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit purpose of a
benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E,
§ 10(e) (“A director shall not have a fiduciary duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general or specific
public benefit purposes of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”).
Recent experimental findings suggest that empowering shareholders alone to engage in enforcement
will undermine fiduciaries’ willingness to respond to the concerns of other constituencies, even if legislation
directs fiduciaries to consider them. See, e.g., Sven Fischer et al., Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An
Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US 26 (Max Planck Inst. for
Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. Bonn 2013/4, 2013), available at
ssrn.com/abstract=2226382 (suggesting enforcement by shareholders alone creates an insufficient “incentive
structure [that] deserve[s] more careful attention by policy-makers”).
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questions, and their own knowledge about operations and industry norms.
Consumers’ and beneficiaries’ positions as users of the social enterprise’s
product or service might give them special insights into its features and
ultimate quality, but little information on how these outcomes are reached or
the entity’s internal operations. The public will be at a considerable
informational deficit relative to other stakeholder groups, but might develop
views of a social enterprise’s performance from passing observations or media
coverage. In a benefit corporation or FPC, employees can use their differential
access and expertise to enhance the value of the significant disclosures
available to all constituencies. The L3C’s lack of disclosure requirements will
accentuate the information gap between employees and other non-investor
stakeholders. To narrow this gap, specialized forms might require additional
disclosures to consumers, beneficiaries, or the public—or provide them with
rights to inquire. Of course, additional reporting burdens will also impose
greater costs on adopting entities, perhaps undermining social entrepreneurs’
enthusiasm for specialized forms.
Assuming stakeholders are informed, they still cannot enforce social-good
prioritization without management, voting, litigation, or other rights to act.
Employees’ positions can provide them with tools for enforcement regardless
of whether additional ones are made available by their enterprise’s
organizational form. Depending on their level of authority, employees may
participate in making precisely those midstream and endgame decisions that pit
profit and social good against each other. In doing so, they may voice their
opinions on the need to prioritize social mission and impact outcomes. A social
enterprise form could impose additional participation rights for employees,
consumers, beneficiaries, or the public. These stakeholders might be granted
dedicated board seats or management authority, approval or veto rights over
existential or even more mundane decisions, or standing to sue for redress.
Again, such innovations would not come without costs. Empowered
stakeholders could become unbearable nags or nuisance-suit plaintiffs.148
Authorizing broad swaths of non-investor stakeholders to challenge the actions
of entities adopting specialized forms could make these forms prohibitively
unattractive to social enterprise founders. Thus far, specialized social
enterprise forms have made the call that these costs and risks are not worth
bearing. They impose only public disclosure obligations, if that. Additional
enforcement tools for non-investor stakeholders have been squarely rejected.

148

See Callison, supra note 38, at 28.
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Even if future legislation were to provide these tools to stakeholders, these
groups will often lack incentives to enforce social-good prioritization. Some
may be highly motivated, even passionate, about their entity’s social mission.
But there are good reasons not to rely too heavily on their willingness to
enforce social-good prioritization, especially if enforcement efforts will be
costly. Employees and customers might have begun working for and buying
from a social enterprise precisely because of its social mission. Yet, they may
stand to gain financially by ignoring its failure to prioritize social good, as
higher profits increase wages and reduce prices.149 Beneficiaries and the public
might be less conflicted in their motivations to enforce social-good
prioritization, but are probably even less likely to take on its costs. And all of
these groups will be challenged by coordination problems.
To activate non-investor stakeholder groups to enforce social-good
prioritization, specialized form legislation would need to impose potentially
onerous disclosure requirements to inform them. It would also have to
empower them with strong enforcement tools to deploy, and may need to help
them overcome serious incentive problems. This is a tall order. Furthermore,
empowering a broad range of stakeholders to challenge the actions of social
enterprises and their leaders may raise the specter of strike suits by
troublemakers and make specialized forms less appealing to social enterprise
founders in the first place.
B. Enforcement from Outside
Legislation might also look outside social enterprises for enforcement of a
social-good prioritization standard. A public regulator could enforce this
mandate, much as state attorneys general and state and federal tax authorities
police the missions of nonprofits. Alternatively, legislation might incentivize
private parties to create entities engaged in this regulatory project.
1. Public Enforcement
The major advantage to public enforcement lies in its public nature. A
public regulator has a mandate to speak for the people writ large and for the
good of society. Again, charity enforcement provides a nice analogy. There,
state attorneys general “represent the public’s interest in the proper use of the
149 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 9–12 (addressing the concern that customers and employees
may ultimately push social enterprises away from their social missions); see also Battilana et al., supra note 9,
at 54 (describing the challenge of maintaining organizational culture and developing talent in a hybrid entity).
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funds raised and held by charitable organizations.”150 By the same token, a
public regulator could vindicate a societal claim to require social enterprises to
prioritize social good. The United Kingdom’s dedicated regulator for its
specialized social enterprise form, the community interest company (CIC),
follows this model.151 In a CIC, legislation specifically prioritizes the public
benefit (or, in their words, community benefit) purposes of adopting social
enterprises.152 The CIC Regulator is a dedicated agency responsible for
determining whether applying entities qualify as CICs, and if established ones
remain so, through review of annual disclosures and investigation to ensure
compliance with community benefit requirements, limits on dividends to
shareholders, and the partial asset lock imposed by the CIC form.153
The public nature of government regulators could also raise potential
obstacles to their use in social enterprise enforcement. A motivated and
sufficiently resourced regulator should engage in significant enforcement when
social enterprises fail to pursue their espoused public good. Yet, public
regulators’ public focus could also cause them to overemphasize the social
mission of social enterprises, undermining social enterprises’ pursuit of profits
for shareholders. Again taking the CIC as an example, critics have argued that
the Regulator set dividend caps too low, overemphasizing community benefit
and making the shares insufficiently attractive to investors.154 A focus on
social good should not be an insurmountable obstacle to public regulation.
Investor interests should be more than sufficient to train the focus of social
enterprise leaders on profit goals. Further, specialized entities should be
150 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
183–94 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (explaining the rationale for the role of public regulators in charity
enforcement). State charity regulators echo this concern for vindicating the public interest in their own
statements of purpose. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. OFF. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://oag.ca.gov/charities/faq#c5 (last visited May 10, 2013) (“The Attorney General represents the public
beneficiaries of charities, who cannot sue in their own right.”); Reviewing Nonprofits and Charitable
Trusts/Gifts, TENN. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. & REP., http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/nonprofit/nonprofit.html (last
visited May 10, 2013) (describing its role in representing “the interest of charitable beneficiaries, potential
charitable beneficiaries and the people of the State of Tennessee”).
151 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES:
STATUS, ROLE, FUNCTION AND LOCATION 5 (2010), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/
docs/leaflets/10-1390-community-interest-companies-regulators-status-role-function-and-location-guide.pdf.
152 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST
COMPANIES: INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NOTES 10 (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/
cicregulator/docs/guidance/12-1333-community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-1-introduction.pdf
(explaining that “CICs are intended to use their assets, income and profits for the benefit of the community
they are formed to serve” and describing their asset-lock and dividend-cap features).
153 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, supra note 151.
154 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 35, at 635–36.
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permitted to pursue profit, but not to prioritize it. Thus, the accountability
lapses needing enforcement attention arise on the social-good side of the social
enterprise equation, where public regulators’ attention to social mission would
be a good fit.155
The more serious challenge to public enforcement is a lack of resources. In
these times of fiscal austerity, states are very unlikely to create and fund new
regulatory agencies. Legislatures might add to attorneys general’s portfolios,
and particularly to their charities bureaus, the duty of ensuring that social
enterprises prioritize social good. After all, these regulators have useful
expertise in enforcing obligations to pursue public benefits in the related area
of charity enforcement.156 Unless such a delegation of authority is
accompanied by appropriation of greater resources, however, it will lead to
very little social enterprise enforcement activity or social enterprise
enforcement only at the expense of charity enforcement. The understaffing and
lack of resources in charities bureaus has been discussed by virtually every
commentator in the field and is, by now, widely accepted as both problematic
and unlikely to change.157 Attorneys general simply lack the capacity to do
more enforcement without greater resources.
In various campaigns to pass L3C and benefit corporation legislation, state
charities bureaus made these very objections. Indeed, Hawaii’s benefit
corporation legislation includes an express disavowal of regulatory
involvement, stating that “[e]nforcement of [adopting entities’] responsibilities
[to operate in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner] comes not
from governmental oversight, but rather from new provisions on transparency
and accountability.”158 An interesting counterexample, however, can be seen in
Illinois’s experience with the L3C. The Illinois L3C statute designates L3Cs
and their CEOs, directors, and managers as “trustees” under the state’s
Charitable Trust Act.159 This designation triggers application of registration

155 But see Tyler, supra note 24, at 151–54 (describing his opposition to such public regulation of L3Cs,
primarily due to concerns it would inappropriately undercut their profit-making purposes and those of their
investors).
156 See supra text accompanying note 150.
157 See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 445–46.
158 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-1 (2012). The Hawaii statute also provides that a benefit corporation’s
annual report must include: “A statement that . . . the sustainable business corporation and its activities are
subject to the oversight of the board of the sustainable business corporation and are not subject to the direct
oversight, regulation, or endorsement of any governmental body.” Id. § 420D-11(a)(8).
159 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (West Supp. 2012) (“Any company operating or holding itself
out as a low-profit limited liability company in Illinois, any company formed as a low-profit limited liability
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and reporting requirements under Illinois charity law and empowers the
attorney general to take enforcement action against L3Cs formed there.160
Although other state attorneys general might argue that social enterprises
adopting specialized forms come within their purview due to their control of
assets dedicated to charitable purposes, thus far Illinois’s direct approach is
exceptional.161
Some of the understaffing of charity enforcement at the state level is
ameliorated by the overlapping jurisdiction of the Federal Internal Revenue
Service.162 The federal role there stems from charities’ desire to obtain the
favorable tax status federal law affords to nonprofits that meet its eligibility
requirements.163 At present, however, specialized forms for social enterprise
are an exclusively state-level phenomenon with no targeted federal benefits.164
Legislation has been introduced in Congress to bless or “fast track” entities
organized as L3Cs as eligible recipients of tax-favored foundation PRIs.165 So

company under this Act, and any chief operating officer, director, or manager of any such company is a
‘trustee’ as defined in Section 3 of the Charitable Trust Act.”).
160 See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 102–06
(2011) (describing Illinois charity law that will apply to “any entity with charitable purposes”); see also Tyler,
supra note 24, at 151 n.144 (expressing serious concerns that the Illinois approach undermines the dualpurpose concept of an L3C).
161 Some benefit entity statutes require filing of annual reports with a state official, but this is purely
ministerial. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 15–16 (West Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West Supp. 2012); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-13 (specifically noting that the
state’s involvement with entity filings is “[m]inisterial”).
162 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 377 (“[S]ince the 1950s the regulatory power of the federal
government has been expanded so that it is effectively the primary source of [charity] regulation, extending to
matters that had previously been the exclusive province of the states and, in many instances, preempting state
regulation by conditioning tax exemption upon compliance with federal standards of behavior.”); see also
James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX
REV. 545 (2010) (challenging the increased IRS role in regulating charity governance based on federalism
concerns).
163 See Fishman, supra note 162, at 549–51 (describing the IRS’s role in an article critiquing the Service
for overstepping it).
164 For analysis of whether social enterprise should receive federal tax advantages, see Joseph M. Binder,
Note, A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class of Hybrid Entities, 78 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise (Jan. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
165 See Philanthropic Facilitation Act, H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Kelly Kleiman, “L3C” Spells
“Caveat Emptor,” STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/l3c_
spells_caveat_emptor (noting that scholars and lawyers “point out that the IRS has not yet issued (and does not
seem inclined to create) a rule awarding automatic program-related investment status to any investment in an
L3C”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Fatal Design Defects of L3Cs, NONPROFIT Q. (June 21, 2010), http://
www.nonprofitquarterly.org/management/5501-the-fatal-design-defects-of-l3cs.html (“Congress has not
created a special category of PRI treatment for low-profit limited liability companies and appears unlikely to
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far it has gained little traction, and its future success is unlikely. The IRS does
not rely on an entity’s state-created legal form to drive tax determinations.166
And, in these times of budget deficits and fiscal crisis, Congress will not be
dispensing broad new tax benefits to social enterprises anytime soon. Without
such an improbable expansion of federal tax benefits, there is simply no
relevant overlapping federal tax jurisdiction to engage in public regulation of
social enterprise.
In sum, while public enforcement might desirably focus on the social
mission of social enterprises, it is an unrealistic solution. State governments
will not be keen to create and fund new agencies. Most attorneys general will
have little appetite for adding responsibilities to their already overloaded and
understaffed charities bureaus. And, using the Federal IRS for this purpose
would require far-fetched, new authorizations and significant investment. To
create a successful legal form for social enterprise, legislatures must look
elsewhere to ensure social-good prioritization will be enforced.
2. Private Regulators
A more plausible course would be for specialized legal forms to create a
market for private, third-party entities to serve as regulators. Legislation
enabling specialized forms can chart the contours of this enforcement role.
Private regulators might be engaged solely to develop and disseminate
information about social enterprises and their practices or to engage more
directly in enforcement themselves. The benefit entity forms attempt to harness
the energies of third-party regulators, albeit in a limited fashion. Other
techniques remain untested.
a. Information Forcing
An information-forcing take on outsourced regulation tasks private
regulators with distributing information about social enterprises adopting
specialized legal forms. For example, private regulators might publicize
disclosures organizations produce, offer comparative and evaluative analysis of
this data, develop and circulate best practices, or some combination of these
options. They could also work as midstream monitors, reviewing entities using
the forms at intervals and publishing results. This role for third-party regulators
do so.”); see also Schmidt, supra note 61, at 170–71 (describing an earlier version of the bill prior to its
introduction in Congress).
166 See Kleinberger, supra note 27, at 905–07.
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asks them only to arm other public or private actors with the information those
parties need to engage in more direct enforcement.
The benefit corporation and benefit LLC forms rely on private third parties
for enforcement in a limited information-forcing role. As noted earlier, to form
as a benefit corporation or benefit LLC, a social enterprise must assert that it is
formed for a general public benefit “as measured by a third-party standard.”167
At a minimum, benefit entity legislation secures the quality of the standards
third parties produce by requiring them to be independent168 and transparent.169
Standing alone, these requirements are insufficient. Typical profit-seeking
corporations other than truly heinous polluters likely create “a material positive
impact on society and the environment”170 by doing business as usual. A third
party could promulgate and publicly disclose a qualifying standard requiring
only that a company employ one or more members of the community, pay
assessed taxes, and avoid fines or penalties for environmental harms for one
year. Without oversight of standard setters, it is easy to imagine standard
setters going further, offering standards requiring only a small donation to a
conservation organization, or the standard setter itself. So long as a benefit
entity is unrelated to such a lax standard setter, and the standard is publicly
available, a company with a quite limited commitment to “social good” could
adopt and self-assess against this low hurdle.
Jurisdictions with later-adopted benefit corporation statutes frequently and
helpfully impose additional requirements for third-party standards.171 About

167 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West Supp. 2012); accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1803(A)(6),
:1811(A) (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702(b), 1706(a) (McKinney Supp. 2012).
168 A benefit corporation or LLC cannot utilize a standard created by an entity with a “material
relationship with [the] benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries . . . either directly or as a shareholder,
partner, member or other owner or a director, officer or other manager of an entity that has a material
relationship with the benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West Supp.
2011); see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e)(1) (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.03(a)(8)(A) (West Supp. 2012).
169 For a standard to be acceptable, the following information about the standard must be publicly
available: “(a) The factors considered when measuring the performance of a business; (b) The relative
weightings of those factors; and (c) The identity of the persons that develop and control changes to the
standard and the process by which those changes are made.” VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord HAW. REV.
STAT. § 420D-12(3)(A)–(E) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8)(B)(i)–(iii).
170 This language is used to describe the general public benefit that benefit corporations must pursue. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782.
171 These standards appear to derive from the Model Benefit Corporation Statute. See Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation, supra note 36, § 102(a). For clarity, please note that this model was promulgated by a
group of benefit corporation advocates, rather than a bar association or general law reform group.
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half of them demand that third-party standards be “comprehensive.”172 These
comprehensiveness standards are variously expressed. Their common core
demands that an acceptable standard considers the impact of entities reviewed
under it on the range of considerations described in the statutes’ standard of
conduct for directors.173 Thus, comprehensiveness injects some substantive
dimension into the statutory floor, but it is also subject to the “too many
masters” critique described above.174 At least four jurisdictions with
comprehensiveness requirements also require third-party standards to be
“credible.”175 Credibility means standard setters “access[] necessary and
appropriate expertise to assess overall corporate social and environmental
performance” and “use[] a balanced multi-stakeholder approach, including a
public comment period of at least 30 days to develop the standard.”176
Comprehensiveness and credibility are welcome additions to the bare-bones
requirements of independence and transparency, and may well encourage third
parties to set standards meaningfully requiring adopting entities to “do both”
profit and social good. They do not, however, require standards to mandate
social-good prioritization. Nor do any of the statutes provide for oversight or
enforcement of the standards that third parties promulgate.
Moreover, it is worth noting again that third-party standard setters
themselves need never review those entities that take their standards on board.
Rather, benefit entity statutes incentivize third parties only to develop and
publicize standards for public benefit and positive societal and environmental
impact. These standards then serve as metrics for organizational selfassessment. Social enterprises seeking recognition as benefit corporations or
172 Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(1) (West 2013) (including a comprehensiveness requirement),
HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(1) (same), 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10 (West Supp. 2012) (same), LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(12)(a) (including a comprehensiveness requirement, though not styled as
such), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 2 (West Supp. 2012) (same), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38130(A)(9)(a) (Supp. 2012) (including a comprehensiveness requirement), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e) (requiring only transparency and independence), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (same),
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g) (same), VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (same), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.03(a)(8) (same).
173 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(1) (requiring a third-party standard to be “[c]omprehensive in
its assessment of the effect of the business and its operations upon the interests listed in section 420D-6(a)
[describing the ‘[s]tandard of conduct for directors’]”). Not every comprehensiveness requirement sweeps this
broadly, however. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(12)(a) (requiring a third-party standard to be
“[c]omprehensive in that it assesses the effect of the corporation and its operations in producing general public
benefit and any specific public benefit specified in the articles”).
174 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
175 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 2; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(3); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 40/1.10; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(9)(a).
176 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10; see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 23.
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benefit LLCs will choose among the third-party standards available, but need
not engage the third-party standard setters to apply them.
This limited information-forcing role for private regulators makes them
merely one early link in a long enforcement chain. Under the benefit entity
statutes, disclosures pegged to third-party standards give shareholders
information to use in enforcement activity. Then, the benefit entity forms rely
on the market to monitor adopting entities and the third-party standards they
select. The legislation assumes there will be a set of highly engaged users for
the information disclosed by adopting entities.
This assumption is dubious. It requires a set of users that is motivated to
seek out and analyze information about the social enterprise with which they
are considering some involvement. But, their appetite for information must
extend still further. They must take the additional step of investigating the
quality of the third-party standard their chosen social enterprise has elected to
employ. And, they must digest and assess the self-evaluation their chosen
social enterprise has undertaken and disclosed, using the third-party standards
as a metric. This is a great deal to ask even of investors and employees, let
alone consumers. Studies suggest donors will not necessarily use
accountability information available regarding charities to which they are
considering making a donation.177 To the extent these data are analogous, the
enforcement value of this particular information-forcing model is questionable.
Third-party standard setters with no baseline mandate to demand social-good
prioritization may simply shift the accountability problem to a different level.

177 See, e.g., HOPE CONSULTING, MONEY FOR GOOD: THE US MARKET FOR IMPACT INVESTMENTS AND
CHARITABLE GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS AND INVESTORS 8, 19–21 (2010), available at http://www.
hopeconsulting.us/pdf/Money%20for%20Good_Final.pdf (reporting findings from a study of charitable donors
that “[f]ew donors do research before they give, and those that do look to the nonprofit itself to provide simple
information about efficiency and effectiveness”); Katie Cunningham & Marc Ricks, Why Measure, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Summer 2004, at 44, 46 (finding negligible interest in performance measures in a study of
donors); William F. Meehan III et al., Investing in Society, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2004, at 35,
36 (describing studies and comments indicating donors do not investigate the governance and finances of
organizations before donating to them); Margaret F. Sloan, The Effects of Nonprofit Accountability Ratings on
Donor Behavior, 38 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 220, 229 (2009) (reporting study finding that a
positive accountability rating resulted in a statistically significant increase in donations to a nonprofit, but that
negative ratings appeared not to impact donors’ contributions); Do Donors Care Whether Nonprofits Are Any
Good?, TACTICAL PHILANTHROPY (June 8, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.tacticalphilanthropy.com/2010/06/dodonors-care-whether-nonprofits-are-any-good/ (reporting on a U.K. poll showing “68% of people would
switch their donations to another charity if they found the one they were supporting was performing badly,”
and yet “68% of people think that an independent [charity] rating system would not affect their giving
decisions”).
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And all of this is a prerequisite to engaging in any kind of enforcement
activity.
Even in the attenuated role they play in benefit entity legislation, the
quality of the standards private regulators produce and circulate is important.
Thus far, specialized form legislation stewards the quality of these standards
by requiring independence and transparency, as well as sometimes
comprehensiveness and credibility.178 Future legislation would be improved by
injecting social-good prioritization as a baseline. This additional content,
though, may exacerbate the problem with declining to oversee the standard
setters. And, lawmakers will likely be just as loathe to appropriate resources
for monitoring private regulators as they are to fund public ones directly.
b. Direct Enforcement
Another approach would authorize private regulators to engage in direct
enforcement. Third-party regulators could certify entities as initially qualified
to adopt a specialized legal form, applying their own or statutorily determined
standards. These gate-keeping entities could also monitor social enterprises
over time. Should an entity initially qualify to use the specialized form but
over time fail to live up to its initial promise, private regulators could be
empowered to revoke access.
Legislation in many fields empowers private regulatory bodies to certify
and monitor the bona fides of governmentally recognized or benefitted entities.
State legislatures rely on certifying agencies like the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to qualify hospitals and
other health care providers to offer various services and to participate in statefinancing schemes.179 The United States Department of Education recognizes
many private accrediting agencies to certify institutions of higher education to
participate in federal financial aid programs.180 Both operate on a continuing
basis and loss of accreditation will often bring with it a loss of recognition by
government agencies and programs. Looking abroad, the Philippines has long
delegated to the Philippine Council for NGO Certification responsibility for
178

See supra notes 170–77.
See State Recognition Details, JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission.org/state_recognition/
state_recognition_details.aspx?ps=100 (last visited May 10, 2013) (providing a comprehensive list of
programs for which JCAHO accreditation is required or permitted).
180 See Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/
accred/accreditation_pg9.html (last modified Feb. 12, 2013) (listing accrediting agencies qualifying
postsecondary schools for Title IV participation).
179
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qualifying its charities to receive government recognition and tax-favored
status.181
None of the currently available legal forms for social enterprise go this far
in empowering private regulators, but such a tack remains possible. In fact,
authorizing private entities to qualify and police social enterprises that adopt
specialized forms would do more to encourage the formation of private
regulators than does the limited information-forcing role they play under
benefit entity schemes. These efforts give only a slight nudge to this market, as
they require adopting entities to utilize third-party standards, but do not require
third parties to apply them. Once a would-be benefit corporation or benefit
LLC acquires the third party’s standards, the social enterprise must apply the
standard to itself. Accessing such standards should not be difficult or
expensive because they must be made public to meet the statutory requirement
of transparency.182
Standards are generally nonrivalrous goods—consumption of them by one
user does not leave any less for another.183 Requiring publication of standards
makes them nonexcludable as well: the very definition of a public good that
competitive markets tend to under-produce.184 Standard setters will be better
able to earn a return on the investments required to generate a useful standard
if hopeful adopters must come to them to obtain or retain certification. Carving
out a more direct and forceful role for private regulators could, therefore, make
the business of private regulation itself more attractive and sustainable.
Of course, the fact that purveyors of social enterprise standards already
exist suggests that there may be successful models for private standard setters,
even if they do not control access to specialized forms. B Lab is perhaps the
181 See The PCNC Public Accountability System, PHILIPPINE COUNCIL FOR NGO CERTIFICATION,
http://www.pcnc.com.ph/pas.php (last visited May 10, 2013); see also Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of
Collective Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
Q. 1039, 1047–49 (2010) (describing the PCNC’s emergence in a piece placing it within a comparative
context); Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit SelfRegulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 823–25 (2005) (similar).
182 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(3)(A)–(E) (2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g)(2)(A)–(C)
(McKinney Supp. 2012).
183 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining
“nonrivalrous consumption” as existing where consumption “by one person does not leave less for any other
consumer”); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982) (terming this quality “jointness of
supply”); Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Nonprofits: An
Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND NONPROFITS, supra note 90,
at 3, 19 (describing the need for standard-setting clubs to create excludable benefits).
184 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 183, at 42–43; HARDIN, supra note 183, at 17.
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most important case to examine. B Lab is a nonprofit entity that has granted
“B” certification to 610 entities meeting its standards for “us[ing] the power of
business to solve social and environmental problems.”185 A company begins
the B certification process by completing a self-assessment of its social and
environmental impact using B Lab’s “B Impact Assessment” tool.186 It also
must adopt changes to its organizational documents that permit fiduciaries to
consider stakeholder interests in making decisions.187 Once these changes are
made, and the assessment and documentation have been reviewed by B Lab
personnel, applicants with sufficiently high scores may license the trademarked
“B” designation.188 They also become part of the B Corp community with
access to discounted services and a supportive group of like-minded
companies.189 B Lab also maintains an ongoing monitoring process, auditing
ten percent of its certified entities each year.190
B Lab was intimately involved with efforts to draft and promote state
benefit corporation legislation,191 even though these statutes require neither
certification by B Lab nor even the use of B Lab’s specific standards. If B Lab,
one of the major forces behind the benefit corporation and benefit LLC
legislation, is not pushing for a more potent role in the social enterprise

185

CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited May 10, 2013) (noting it has certified
744 B Corporations, representing $4.2 billion in revenues and 60 industries).
186 See How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited May 10, 2013).
187 See Protect Your Mission, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (last visited
May 10, 2013).
188 See How to Become a B Corp, supra note 186.
189 See Why Become a B Corp?, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/whybecome-a-b-corp (last visited May 10, 2013). By becoming a B Corp., an entity can “[s]ave [m]oney and
[a]ccess [s]ervices” through group discounts, id., and help lead a movement to “redefine success in business.”
Why B Corps Matter, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter
(last visited May 10, 2013).
190 See On-Site Reviews, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/become-a-b-corp/howto-become-a-b-corp/119 (last visited May 10, 2013). The results of the 2010 reviews can be found on the B
Corporation website. The summary there reports:
Twenty companies passed their on-site reviews, and two company reviews, Busboys & Poets and
U.S. Tile, are still under review. As a result of the on-site review process, on average each
company had its survey score adjusted upwards by 1.6 points or 1.6% of their total scores.
Utilikilts, Institute of Green Professionals and Kings Counsel were also selected for on-site
review but decertified prior to review. Vetrazzo was also selected for an onsite review, but was
purchased by another company prior to the review.
Id.
191 See Passing Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation
(last visited May 10, 2013).
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enforcement architecture, perhaps a limited information-forcing role is
sufficient to promote others to enter the market. Only experience will provide
the answer to this question.
It is important to recognize, however, that B Lab has found a market for its
services outside of the legislative context. It offers B licensees access to group
discounts and a potentially valuable mark for branding, even without being tied
to a specialized form. B Lab also may be motivated by forces beyond its own
financial success. After all, it is organized as a nonprofit, with a mission of
“serv[ing] a global movement of entrepreneurs using the power of business to
solve social and environmental problems.”192 B Lab explains its leadership on
the legislative front as a service to its customers and this movement.193 Unless
we are content to rely on this single, even if presumably altruistic, private
regulator, we must consider whether other private regulators will enter the
market to create third-party standards with only a limited information-forcing
role.
Of course, the goal is not merely to generate private regulators. Rather,
these regulators must sufficiently produce or contribute to enforcement for
specialized forms to succeed. Third parties in this role should admit only those
social enterprises worthy of adopting a special form. If they are likewise
empowered to adjudicate compliance over time, private regulators need to
monitor and audit adopting entities and should revoke status when entities go
astray. The most aggressive use of third-party regulators would also authorize
them to impose penalties beyond revocation of status. Failure to exercise these
gate-keeping functions responsibly raises the specter of greenwashing, or
worse, corruption. Thus, this Article’s recommendations regarding the need to
strengthen content requirements for third-party standards apply with even
greater force if private regulators’ roles are expanded beyond information
forcing. In addition, if a legislature delegates to private third parties the right to
qualify entities for access to legal form or punish them for noncompliance, it
also should provide for monitoring these delegees. Expecting investors and
consumers to investigate and police their bona fides expects far too much.
Finally, it must be recognized that casting private regulators as gatekeepers
sets for them an extremely difficult job. Third-party certification schemes are
192 See The Nonprofit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited May 10, 2013).
193 See Passing Legislation, supra note 191 (describing B Lab’s leadership on benefit corporation
legislation).
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exceedingly difficult to get right because they have two important ingredients
that are often in tension. On the one hand, they require a level of penetration
and acceptance to have an impact; certification is valuable only if it is common
enough that consumers of this information recognize it.194 Thus, gatekeepers
cannot apply such onerous standards that few applicants make the cut, or
nobody will know or care about certification anyway. On the other hand, they
are only as good as the standards they enforce; certification is meaningless if it
is so easily achieved that it is no mark of distinction.195 Gatekeeping private
regulators must not apply such a weak screen that they certify too many
applicants, or their stamps of approval will be well-known but little-valued.
Threading this needle will be a challenge for B Lab and any new entrants
specialized form legislation encourages to join the private regulatory market.
Specialized forms can enlist third-party regulators as part of their
enforcement architecture. Thus far, only the benefit entity forms have done so,
and have endowed them with a limited information-forcing role. Future
legislation can replicate this approach, or can cast private regulators in more
fulsome information-forcing or direct-enforcement roles or both. In any case,
private regulators’ contribution to enforcement will be determined by the
content of the standards they apply and the energy and care with which they
apply them.
C. Conclusion
Legislatures can select from among an expansive range of options to
enforce social-good prioritization from within or outside social enterprises.
Extant specialized forms already grant investors an assortment of
informational, voting, and litigation rights. Legislatures could expand these or
grant investors greater rights in management. Additional stakeholder groups,
including employees, consumers, beneficiaries, and even the public more
broadly, might also be tapped to enforce social-good prioritization. If resources
should become available, public regulators might be tasked with enforcement
as well. Or, legislation could seed a market for private regulators to do the job.
For enforcement by any of these parties to help specialized forms achieve
social mission, the law must impose a clear standard for them to enforce. Even
with such a standard, however, serious obstacles will bedevil legislatures’

194
195

See Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 60; Gugerty & Prakash, supra note 183, at 20.
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 60; Gugerty & Prakash, supra note 183, at 20.
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attempts to provide potential enforcers with information relevant to judge
compliance, effective enforcement tools, and incentives to act.
IV. BRANDING DIFFERENCE
Ultimately, social entrepreneurs seeking specialized forms want these new
forms to brand their enterprises as different. “Brands are sets of associations
linked to a name or mark associated with a product or service,” or here, an
entity.196 Social entrepreneurs want to create a brand for their individual
enterprises, of course. But, in their search for specialized forms, they also
desire this legal form to create a brand for any organization that inhabits it.197
They want the specialized form, whether it be an L3C, benefit corporation,
FPC, or some other new entrant, to identify adopting entities as “distinct.”198
Social entrepreneurs wish to use specialized forms to convince contributors of
capital to invest in their brand, employees to trust it, and the broader public to
value it. This Part evaluates what role specialized forms can play in these
efforts.
Social entrepreneurs want specialized forms to identify their entities as
meaningfully different from both traditional businesses and traditional
charities, but still appeal to those who would contribute capital to both. Ideally,
specialized forms would help them to attract equity capital from market
investors as well as contributions from traditional charitable donors. Neither
result, however, is likely. For market-rate investors purely interested in profits,
an ownership interest in an entity adopting a specialized form that credibly
commits it to pursue social good along with profit is simply no substitute for a
share of a traditional for-profit.199 Without the incentive of tax deductibility, a
196 Tim Calkins, The Challenge of Branding, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING 1, 8 (Alice M. Tybout & Tim
Calkins eds., 2005).
197 See LANG, supra note 123 (“Probably more importantly than anything else, the L3C is a brand . . . .”);
Kelley, supra note 9, at 361–62 (discussing “[t]he [c]hallenge of ‘[b]randing’ [s]ocial [e]nterprises”).
198 Dictionary, AM. MARKETING ASS’N, http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?d
Letter=B (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (defining “brand”).
199 L3C advocates have asserted this form will encourage tranched investing, including a tranche
attractive to market-rate investors. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic
Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010) (describing this technique and how it can
provide “a market rate of return for market-rate investors”). In the words of the form’s principal proponent:

[The L3C] facilitates layered investing with [foundation investors] usually taking first risk
position thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture for other investors in more secure
positions. . . . The rest of the investment levels become more attractive to commercial investment
by improving the credit rating and thereby lowering the cost of capital. It is particularly favorable
to equity investment.
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donation to an entity adopting a specialized form is likewise not a substitute for
one to a recognized charity. Thus far, specialized forms come with no tax
benefits for contributors,200 and Congress is unlikely to extend such benefits in
the near future.201
Two groups of capital contributors can more likely straddle the middle of
this divide. First, there are the mysterious and vaunted “socially responsible”
or “impact investors,” who are willing to take a below-market return to achieve
simultaneous social good with their invested funds.202 Such investors might be
socially motivated venture capital firms or angel investors, as well as
individuals and institutions (including mutual funds) that target companies
pursuing both social good and profit for owners. Efforts to size this impact, or
socially responsible investment market, value it in the billions or even trillions

AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., WHAT IS THE L3C? (2011), available at http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.
org/downloads/What%20is%20the%20L3C%20080711-1.pdf; accord LANG, supra note 123. In my view,
even without a clear and enforceable social-good prioritization mandate, market investors will be wary of the
L3C’s mixed motives, especially if governance arrangements are structured to give foundation investors
control. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 35, at 647–48. Others have argued this structure may breach the
prohibitions on inurement or private benefit for foundations that might invest in L3Cs, see Bishop, supra note
35, at 263–65, and that it may make L3Cs less attractive to “socially minded” mezzanine-tier investors. See
Murray & Hwang, supra note 35, at 50–51; Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1317–
19 (2011).
200 Philadelphia has introduced an extremely limited tax benefit for which some social enterprises
adopting specialized forms will qualify. See Credits, Grants & Other Incentives, BUS. SERVICES, https://
business.phila.gov/Pages/TaxCreditsOtherIncentives.aspx (last visited May 10, 2013) (providing $4000 tax
credit to twenty-five sustainable businesses per year, and including certified B Corporations within eligible
group); see also Anurag Gupta, Note, L3Cs and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field Between
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 225 (2011) (reporting
“rumor[s]” other municipalities will follow suit); Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill
in San Francisco, NONPROFIT TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/article/detail/benefitcorporation-in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco-4497 (describing opposition to a San Francisco measure
under consideration to grant city contracting preferences to benefit corporations).
201 See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
202 See Kelley, supra note 9, at 358 (“Social entrepreneurs view Socially Responsible Investing, or SRI, as
a potential source of growth capital for the emerging fourth sector.”). Socially responsible investors
“incorporate social criteria into their investment decisions.” Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern
Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681,
681 (2002). Impact investors are typically defined as investing “to create positive impact alongside financial
return,” J.P. MORGAN, INSIGHT INTO THE IMPACT INVESTMENT MARKET 2 (2011), though some use the term to
denote investors who “seek a social return first and foremost.” Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal
Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 294 (2012); accord Paul Sullivan,
Philanthropists Weigh the Returns of Doing Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at B5 (describing “impact
investing” as “essentially investing money in an organization, either profit-making or nonprofit, with the
expectation that it will generate a social benefit and perhaps a financial return”).
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of dollars.203 Social enterprise is a complex and challenging concept, and the
market for capital is brisk and competitive. If specialized forms can serve as an
effective brand to reach this market, adopting such forms will be quite valuable
indeed.204
The puzzle about these investors is why they would not prefer to invest for
a market rate of return and then make a tax-deductible donation of some
portion of their return to a nonprofit charity pursuing their preferred social
mission. One explanation is that such investors believe they can get different,
better, and even more social good from a social enterprise pursuing social
mission and profit together than from a nonprofit pursuing social good alone.
This belief might be founded on the idea that the partial profit motive of a
social enterprise leads to more efficient social-good production.205 Nonprofits
are frequently charged with inefficiency and waste, in part due to their lack of
investor principals who could hold fiduciary agents accountable.206
Alternatively, or in combination, these investors might believe that social-good
production by a social enterprise will be qualitatively different, perhaps being
less influenced by elitism or cultural imperialism, which some charge has
infected traditional philanthropy.207 Investors who view social enterprise’s
203 See HOPE CONSULTING, supra note 177, at 61 (finding a $120 billion market opportunity to increase
impact investing); J.P. MORGAN, supra note 202, at 5 (reporting “[t]he 52 investors that responded to our
online survey have indicated that they plan to invest a total of USD [$3.8 billion] in the 12 months following
the survey”); MONITOR INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR
CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 9 (2009), available at http://www.monitorinstitute.com/
impactinvesting/documents/InvestingforSocialandEnvImpact_FullReport_004.pdf (valuing the potential size
of the impact investing market at $500 billion); SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010) (“At the start of 2010, professionally managed assets
following SRI strategies stood at $3.07 trillion . . . .”); DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 60 (2005) (reporting that in 2003, $151 billion
was under management with investment funds that screen companies for social impact).
It is difficult to size the market for social enterprise investments specifically. Some of the estimates
above include mutual funds that merely screen out certain investments deemed socially irresponsible by their
investors, like tobacco or weaponry producers. These funds appeal to some investors’ desires not to fund
production of products they abhor, but do not line up with social enterprise writ large and certainly not with
entities adopting specialized forms.
204 It is also possible that investors will see specialized forms as a distinct disadvantage, merely because
of their novelty.
205 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 5–6.
206 See, e.g., Katz & Page, supra note 128, at 95.
207 See, e.g., THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
(INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2007); Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations
and the Forces Against Them: Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 479–92 (2012)
(describing the anti-NGO movement’s claims of NGO elitism and cultural imperialism, among other failings);
Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
737, 803–04 (2002) (“Philanthropies have engendered a sense of mistrust because of their concentration of
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hybridity as part of its value will be looking for entities they can trust with
their capital. Adopting a specialized form that indicates an enforceable
commitment to prioritize social good might well draw in these investors and
their funds.
The other group of capital contributors social enterprises should try to
reach might be called “quasi-donors.” Quasi-donors prefer to mix their
donations toward a social good with product or service purchases. They make
payments in which they expect to receive something less than full and fair
consideration in return. They overpay in order to enable the recipient to
dedicate some portion of its revenues to achieving their shared vision of social
good. In a way, this is simply the other side of the coin of the impact investor,
but the emphasis is on the donation, rather than the investment side. Sales
revenue from pink products, yellow bracelets, and countless other causerelated marketing efforts provide ample evidence consumers are willing to part
with their funds on this category of expenditure.208
A quasi-donation might be attractive for at least two reasons. A quasidonation may be a lesser risk than a pure donation, as a quasi-donor will
receive some valuable item or service in return for her funds.209 In addition,
like impact investors, quasi-donors may be convinced that the hybrid nature of
social enterprise will produce more, better, or qualitatively different social
good than will charities.210 Thus, they may prefer to make quasi-donations over
unlinked donations and product purchases. For quasi-donors too, then,
branding is key. To reach their funds, a social enterprise must convince quasidonors it offers this ideal, blended value. Specialized forms can also be part of
this effort.
As currently constituted, however, specialized forms provide very little
branding value. One cannot create a brand for social enterprises through legal
power and wealth, added to their ability to control valuable assets that might otherwise go to public coffers.”);
Courtney Martin, The Future of Philanthropy, AM. PROSPECT (June 8, 2009), http://prospect.org/article/futurephilanthropy (describing groups challenging the perceived elitism of the nonprofit sector).
208 See Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 885
(2010) (describing more than $1 billion in cause-related marketing revenues earned by charities in 2005).
209 Of course, tax deductibility can reduce the real cost of a pure donation to a qualifying charity. See
I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006). As discussed, social enterprises will not qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions,
and thus the difference in cost for a donation and quasi-donation may be closer than it would originally appear.
210 Quasi-donors may also desire to be seen as consumers of socially responsible or environmentally
friendly goods. See generally FRAN HAWTHORNE, ETHICAL CHIC: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANIES WE
THINK WE LOVE (2012) (describing this consumer preference and exploring whether the companies consumers
presume to be ethical actually are).
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forms without permitting them to express how different their enterprises are.
But, this expressive function is essentially the only one current specialized
forms serve. For a specialized form to credibly brand adopting entities as
different, it must signal that these entities actually achieve both social good and
profit objectives. Thus, for branding purposes too, specialized forms must
impose a standard meaningfully distinguishing those adopting it from
traditional nonprofits and for-profits. Social-good prioritization is that
standard, but its adoption alone is still insufficient. To serve as an effective
brand, a specialized form must also instill confidence that social-good
prioritization will be enforced. Each of the potential enforcement mechanisms
available faces serious obstacles. Future legislation must overcome these
challenges, and both impose and enforce social-good prioritization for
specialized forms to function effectively as brands.
Of course, even if lawmakers take up the social-good prioritization
standard and find enforceable methods by which to enforce it, a specialized
form will only convey a fairly general message. It will communicate that an
adopting social enterprise, on balance, prioritizes social good. Obtaining this
level of brand messaging from a legal form of organization is an ambitious
goal and it would be a significant achievement. But, the branding goals social
entrepreneurs have for their entities do not stop there. They want to convince
consumers to buy and beneficiaries to trust their different and better
products.211 They want to attract and retain employees to their different and
better jobs.212 They want to convince other companies, communities, and the
public that they will be different and better partners for creating long-term
economic and social value. In a crowded market of for-profits, nonprofits, and
social enterprises, each social enterprise must persuade these audiences that the
value proposition it offers is especially attractive. Social entrepreneurs and
their advocates will need to be the driving force in their own branding efforts.
And, they will need to do more than adopt a specialized legal form—even the
most fully realized one—to convey their unique appeal to the numerous
audiences they need to persuade.
The fact that even powerful specialized forms are not alone sufficient to
secure success does not detract from the value they can offer to social
enterprise. Legal forms rarely serve as the single indicator of worth to all of the
211 See VOGEL, supra note 203, at 47–56 (analyzing whether consumers are moved by a producer’s
commitment to pursuing social good).
212 See id. at 56–60 (evaluating whether and to what extent employees seek out employers based on their
commitment to pursuing social good).
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markets and stakeholders with whom an entity will interact. Social enterprises
have many other available avenues to further distinguish themselves. They can
use traditional marketing levers and novel advertising approaches to inform
investors, consumers, and the public about what makes their social mission
particularly compelling. To shore up these claims, they can invest in obtaining
voluntary certifications of overall quality, like that offered by B Lab, or those
available in their individual industry or geographic location.213 The law can do
good work here. It should strive to improve specialized form legislation so that
it does provide a brand for a new and different type of entity—one that
prioritizes social mission but still distributes profits to owners. Social
enterprises adopting these forms will need to take it from there and do the hard
work of making their ventures a success.
CONCLUSION
Founders and proponents of social enterprise frustrated with the polar
categories of nonprofit and for-profit form appear to have found
accommodating audiences in state legislatures. A third of U.S. jurisdictions
have approved legislation sanctioning L3Cs, benefit corporations, or FPCs, and
more will almost certainly follow.214 Unfortunately, however, these enactments
will only begin to address the goals social entrepreneurs have for specialized
forms. These statutes permit social entrepreneurs to dedicate their entities to a
very different model—one of doing both social good and profit. They fall
short, however, of structuring organizations falling under them to ensure they
actually will be different. This failing will prevent these specialized forms
from functioning as effective brands.
For specialized forms to achieve more, legislation adopting them should
provide a clear standard requiring adopting entities to prioritize social good
and must develop meaningful enforcement mechanisms. The social-good
prioritization standard will be challenging to apply and will not answer every
quandary a social enterprise faces. It will, however, usefully distinguish
adopting entities from their traditional for-profit counterparts and will offer
organizational leaders needed guidance in many difficult situations. Meeting
the enforcement challenge will be more difficult. Whether legislation activates
enforcement resources within or outside social enterprises, there will be
213 See, e.g., List of Standards, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/selecting-athird-party-standard/list-of-standards (last visited May 10, 2013) (listing a range of standards for assessing a
company’s “sustainability practices”).
214 See supra note 31.
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incentive problems, resource gaps, and market factors to overcome. Without
offering some reliable means to enforce the meaningful difference a socialgood prioritization standard signifies, however, specialized forms will fail to
steward social enterprises’ dual goals and will not develop into effective
brands.

